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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to improve the way failures caused by insufficient maintenance are 
being managed and reported on drilling rigs and thereby reducing the overall downtime and 
related cost for the rigs. 
 
By looking into the quality of reports for critical and non-critical failures, identifying the 
potential consequences of non-critical failures and identifying downtime trends and possible 
reasons for these we will try to make suggestions on how to improve the maintenance 
management.  
 
The downtime caused by insufficient maintenance was found to be low compared to other 
causes, with 3
rd
 party suppliers being the cause of a large percentage of the downtime.  
 
After introducing first line maintenance in 2006 there is a significant decrease in the number 
of downtime events. The downtime is however not decreasing with the reduction of events; 
this is most likely because the downtime is dominated by large single events. These large 
single downtime events have not been reduced as successfully as the smaller with the 
introduction of first line maintenance. Further studies of these large downtime events should 
be done in order to better prevent them from occurring again in the future. 
 
Most of the downtime was found to be caused be a small selection of equipment groups, with 
the main contributor being the Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group. 
 
Using planned downtime has shown to reduce not only the unplanned downtime, but also the 
overall downtime of the rig. 
 
When studying the effect of major overhauls on two different rigs we found that it preserved a 
very low downtime and need for maintenance for one rig and significantly lowered both for 
the other rig. 
 
The quality of the reports was studied against existing guidelines and requirements as well as 
the requirements during the work of this thesis. Two of the databases were found to contain 
data of good quality, while the third in large parts not only failed to meet the requirements in 
this thesis, but also the existing internal requirements of NADL. To use the databases to find 
any hidden downtime was found to be difficult, if not impossible. A different set of criteria’s 
in the reports have been proposed in this thesis in order to make this possible. To increase the 
overall quality of the reports it was found that improved communication between receiver and 
sender most likely will give good results.  
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Abbreviations & nomenclature 
 
NADL   North Atlantic Drilling Limited 
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1. Introduction 
 
Avoiding downtime of all drilling units is important for any drilling company. Not only does 
such downtime have direct financial consequences, but it will also have indirect effects such 
as loss of reputation and desirability. Therefore; being the “class leader” in downtime will not 
only make each drilling operation more profitable, but also make it easier to get new contracts 
in the future. Having low downtime can also result in better contractual agreements since the 
contractor will have a more reliable time frame for the drilling operation. 
 
In this thesis downtime is defined as any period of time where the drilling rig is delayed from 
performing its intended operations. There can be many different causes for a rig to experience 
downtime (Dew and Childers, 1989), from bad weather to equipment failure and emergencies 
such as fire.  
 
One way of reducing the downtime is to optimize the maintenance of the rig and its 
equipment. Finding the optimal balance between cost of the maintenance and cost of 
downtime will maximize the financial profit. 
 
When we talk about failures we often divide them into two classes; the critical failures and the 
non-critical failures. The difference between these two classifications is defined by the 
consequences of the failure. Critical failures have direct consequences for the ongoing 
operation and will result in downtime, while non-critical failures will not directly result in any 
downtime. As a result of this definition/classification the same failure can be critical in one 
stage of the operation and non-critical in another stage of the operation. 
 
Since the critical failures have more visible and larger consequences the companies have a 
higher focus on these failures. The requirements to the maintenance reports, observations and 
data obtained from such failures are much higher than for non-critical failures. We therefore 
risk that potentially critical failures are poorly reported and/or ignored.  
 
This thesis will look into the historical downtime of five different mobile operating drilling 
units (hereafter only called MODU). It will look for historical downtime trends, the reasons 
for these and possible future ways to reduce downtime. The main focus will be on downtime 
caused by poor or insufficient maintenance, and how equipment failures are classified, 
managed and reported for maintenance improvements.  
 
All the rigs in this thesis is owned and operated by North Atlantic Drilling Limited and all 
operate in the North Sea.  
 
 
1.1 Objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to improve the way failures caused by insufficient maintenance are 
being managed and reported on MODU`s, and thereby reducing the overall downtime and 
related costs. 
 
By looking into the quality of reports for critical and non-critical failures, identifying the 
potential consequences of non-critical failures and identifying downtime trends and possible 
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reasons for these we will try to make suggestions on how to improve the maintenance 
management.  
 
 
1.2 Limitations 
 
This study will be using collected internal data from NADL`s five drilling rigs operating in 
Europe; West Alpha, West Phoenix, West Navigator, West Venture and West Epsilon. The 
collected data will be from 2004 until the end of 2010, but data prior to 2010 will not be as 
detailed as the data from 2010. Detailed information on the management of failures will 
therefore mainly be from 2010. 
 
Only the economic consequences will be taken into consideration, ignoring all other 
consequences such as personnel injury, environmental disasters and so on.  
 
Interview with onshore and offshore maintenance personnel will be conducted in order to 
complement the data analysis. 
 
 
1.3 North Atlantic Drilling Limited 
 
NADL consists of five operating rigs and one rig under construction as of 3. April 2011 
(Seadrill, 2011a).  
 
North Atlantic Drilling Limited (NADL) was formed in April 2011, until then all the rigs now 
owned and managed by NADL was owned and managed by Seadrill Limited. Seadrill 
Limited was established in 2005 and has since been in rapid expansion, going from a total of 
21 operating units when they acquired Smedvig ASA in 2006 to a total of 53 units operating 
as of February 2011 (Seadrill, 2011b).  
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2. Drilling units and equipment 
 
We will here briefly introduce the drilling units used in theses thesis, their equipment and how 
a typical drilling operation is done. 
 
 
2.1 Drilling Units 
 
This study looks into NADLs five drilling units operating in Europe. Most of the drilling rigs 
have their own specifications, the biggest differences is the design of the hull and if it is a ram 
rig or draw work rig. We will briefly introduce the different rigs here with a short description 
of their design and recent track record. 
 
 
2.1.1 West Alpha 
 
 
 
Figure 1: West Alpha (Seadrill, 2011b) 
 
West Alpha was built in 1986 and is the oldest of the drilling rigs, it have been modified 
several times during its lifetime, latest in 2009. It is a semisubmersible rig with draw works 
able to operate at water depths from 60 to 600 m with a drilling depth of 7000 m. 
 
West Alpha has mainly been operating in the North Sea and during 2010 it operated in six 
different fields as shown in  
Table 1. Prior to 2010 it has been operating in the North Sea since it was built, with only two 
operations in other areas.  
 
Table 1: West Alpha track record 2010 
Country Operator Field Well Type Well Start 
Norway Petro Canada Statfjord Beta Appraisal July 2010 
Norway Statoil Alve Development 
sub sea 
completion 
June 2010 
Norway Centrica Cearus Exploration May 2010 
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Norway Centrica Fogelberg Exploration May 2010 
Norway Nexen Brand Exploration January 2010 
 
 
2.1.2 West Epsilon 
 
 
Figure 2: West Epsilon (Seadrill, 2011b) 
 
West Epsilon was built in 1993, but has been modified several times, latest in 2002. It is a 
Jack-up design with draw work able to operate on water depths up to 120 m with a drilling 
depth up to 9100 m. 
 
West Epsilon has mainly been operating in the North Sea and during 2010 it only operated in 
one field as shown in Table 2. Prior to 2010 it has been operating in the North Sea since it was 
built, with only one operation in other areas. 
 
Table 2: West Epsilon track record 2010 
Country Operator Field Well Type Well Start 
Norway Statoil Sleipner 15/9-
B 
Development/Exploration 
wells 
July 2009 - 
present 
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2.1.3 West Venture 
 
 
Figure 3: West Venture (Seadrill, 2011b) 
 
West Venture was built in 2000 at the Hitachi yard and is a semisubermsible ram rig able to 
operate at water depths up to 1800 m and with a drilling depth exceeding 9000 m. 
 
West Venture has only been operating in the North Sea and during 2010 it operated on one 
field as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: West Venture track record 2010 
Country Operator Field Well Type Well Start 
Norway Statoil Troll 31/2 Development/P&A/Completion March 2000 
- present 
 
 
2.1.4 West Phoenix 
 
 
Figure 4: West Phoenix (Seadrill, 2011b) 
 
West Phoenix was built in 2008 and is a submersible ram rig able to operate at water depths 
up to 3000 meters and with a drilling depth exceeding 9000 meter. 
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West Phoenix has only been operating in the North Sea and during 2010 it operated on three 
fields as shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: West Phoenix track record 2010 
Country Operator Field Well Type Well Start 
UK BP UK Devenick 9/29a-
S2 
Development 
subsea 
completion / 
HPHT 
December 2010 
Faroe Island ENI Denmark Anne Marie 
6004/8a-A 
Exploration July 2010 
 
 
 
 
2.1.5 West Navigator 
 
 
Figure 5: West Navigator (Seadrill, 2011b) 
 
West Navigator was built in 2000 and is a dynamically positioned drill ship with a ram rig 
able to operate at water depths up to 2500 meters and with a drilling depth exceeding 9000 
meters. 
 
West Navigator has only been operating in the North Sea lately and during 2010 it operated 
on one fields as shown in Table 5. Prior to 2010 it have operated in several different areas 
since it was built. 
 
Table 5: West Navigator track record 2010 
Country Operator Field Well Type Well Start 
Norway Shell Ormen Lange Development 
drilling and 
subsea 
completion 
September 2005 
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2.2 Drilling equipment 
 
One of the main challenges for NADL is that few of the drilling units operating in Europe are 
of the same design. They have however tried to make a generic equipment hierarchy across 
the different designs, shown in Table 6. This is based on the SFI group system 
(Skipsforskningsinstitutt, 1983), but there are some variations in the coding from rig to rig. 
 
Table 6: Equipment groups used by NADL, based on SFI 
RIG 
Drilling Equipment and 
systems 
Platform Equipment Platform Common Systems 
- Derrick With 
Components 
- Drill Floor Equipment 
and Systems 
- Bulk and Mud Systems 
- Well Control Equipment 
and Systems 
- Pipe Handling 
Equipment and Systems 
- Drill String and 
Downhole Equipment 
and Systems 
- Material Handling 
Equipment and Systems 
- Service Equipment and 
Systems 
- Misc. Equipment, 
Systems and Services 
- Maneuvering Machinery 
and Equipment 
- Navigation and 
Searching Equipment 
- Communication 
Equipment 
- Anchoring, Mooring 
and Towing Equipment 
- Repair, Maintenance 
and Cleaning, Outfitting 
- Lifting and Transport 
Equipment for 
Machinery 
- Ballast and Bilge 
Systems. Gutter Pipes 
Outside 
- Fire & Lifeboat alarm, 
Fire Fight & Wash 
Down. 
- Air And Sounding 
Systems from Tanks to 
Deck 
- Special Common 
Hydraulic Oil Systems 
- Electrical Power Supply 
- Electrical Distribution 
Common Systems 
- Electrical Common 
Systems 
- Electrical Consumers 
 
The equipment groups in Table 6 is used for further analysis in this thesis and the most 
relevant groups will be further explained.  
 
Each of the different groups in Table 6 have a designated number, for instance all equipment 
under the “Drill Floor Equipment and Systems” have an object id starting with 31. Under this 
group we find the “Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment” with object id 313. For 
the rigs that don’t follow this coding structure we have still sorted the equipment under these 
codes, but have had to do it manually. 
 
Within these groups there is some equipment that has to be in working condition in order for 
the rig to function as intended. The equipment needed for the rig to function as intended 
depends on what the rigs operation is at the time. Moving the rig will require a different set of 
equipment than drilling for instance. The equipment in these sets are what we define as 
critical equipment, this means that they are all critical in order for the rig to perform as 
intended. 
 
Since the main purpose of the rigs in this study is drilling operations we will focus on the 
equipment critical for such operations. If one or more of the critical equipment fails the entire 
drilling operation will fail and we will experience downtime. 
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A drilling operation has four main operations; rotating, hoisting, circulating and power. Each 
of these four main operations requires different sets of equipment. We will briefly explain the 
four main operations and mention some of the equipment used. 
 
In order to drill a hole you need to rotate a drill bit, this is normally done by rotating the entire 
drill string with the use of a turntable or hydraulic powered top head drive. Figure 6 is a 
simplified illustration of the equipment used in a typical drilling operation. Here you can see 
the turntable and the engines that turn it. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Anatomy of an oil rig (www.howstuffworks.com, 2011) 
 
 
When you have drilled a certain distance you need to attach a new pipe to the drill string. In 
order to do this you need to hoist the pipe before connecting the new pipe to the drill string. 
This is done either by the use of draw works or a hoisting ram; in Figure 6 we have a derrick 
with draw works. The main difference between this setup and a ram rig using a hoisting ram 
is that the hoisting ram, as seen in Figure 7, uses hydraulic rams to hoist and lower the pipes 
in cooperation with the hoisting lines. 
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Figure 7: Ram rig (www.ogj.com, 2011) 
 
The circulating system has several important functions; 
- Transport rock fragments and cuttings from the bottom hole to the surface 
- Reduce friction for the drill bit 
- Cool the drill bit 
- Maintain pressure in the hole and prevent the surrounding formation to enter the hole. 
 
A drilling fluid, called drilling mud, is used for this. The mud is normally a mix of water, 
minerals, clay and chemicals that are mixed in tanks on the platform and circulated down the 
drill string, out of the drill bit and back to the platform through the annulus as shown in Figure 
8. 
 
 
Figure 8:  Mud circulating system (www.petroleumonline.com, 2011) 
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For the different equipment to work we need power. Normally we use one or more generators 
that provide electricity for this. 
 
In addition to the equipment needed in order to perform the four operations mentioned above 
we have to have some safety barriers in place in case we lose control of the well. The most 
important safety barrier is the blowout preventer (BOP) as you can see in Figure 9. The BOP 
is in essence a large valve that the drill string is routed through, the main functions of this 
valve is to stop uncontrolled flow and pressure from the well from reaching the platform. The 
BOP does this by sealing of the well and its fluids, preventing it from reaching the platform. 
Losing control of the well can have very serious consequences, not only economically, but 
also for the environment and the safety of the personnel. The Deepwater Horizon accident is a 
good example of the possible consequences of a failure in the BOP (DNV, 2011b). Because of 
the possible severe consequences of a failure there are very strict rules and regulations when it 
comes to BOP`s, and you are not allowed to continue drilling if the BOP don’t fulfill these 
requirements. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Diagram of blowout preventer (www.slb.com, 2011). 
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2.2.1 Differences from rig to rig 
 
As we briefly have shown in chapter 2 there are some differences in drilling equipment from 
rig to rig. The main differences are caused by the rig either being a draw work rig or a ram 
rig. Except for this difference there are mostly only minor differences in the equipment 
relating to having different manufacturers. A short overview of the differences in 
manufacturer of some of the equipment on the rigs in this study is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Manufacturers of equipment on the different rigs 
 West Alpha West Phoenix West 
Navigator 
West Epsilon West Venture 
BOP Cameron T 
BOP 18 ¾” – 
15k 
Cameron 18 
¾” 
Hydril, 
Compact BOP 
18 ¾” – 15k 
Cameron 21 
¼” – 5k, 
Shaeffer 13 
5/8” 15k 
Hydril, 
Compact 
BOP 18 ¾” – 
15k 
BOP 
Control 
System 
Cameron, 
Pilot 
hydraulic 
system – 
3000 psi WP 
Cameron Hydril, 
Multiplex 
Koomey Hydril, 
Multiplex 
Topdrive MH DDM 
650-C-DC-
500 S 
DDM 650 
HY Aux rig 
DDM 1000 
HY Main rig 
 
Main rig MH 
750 t 
Aux rig 650 t 
Hydraulic 
Units 
Varco TDS 2 ea DDM 
650 HY 
 
Rotary 
Table 
Wirth RTSS 
49.5” 
Hydraulic 
Driven 
Wirth 60 1/2" 
Wirth 49 1/2" 
2 ea Varco 
RST 60 1/2" 
 
CET-4950-65 
Hydraulic 
Driven 
2 ea Varco 
RST 60 1/2" 
 
Drawworks 
/ Ram Rig 
Wirth GH 
3000 E 
Aker MH, 
hydraulic 
with 4 
cylinders 
(RAM) 
 
Aker MH, 
hydraulic with 
2 cylinders 
(RAM) 
 
CE C3 3000 
HP 
Aker MH, 
hydraulic 
with 2 
cylinders 
(RAM) 
 
 
The small differences in equipment from one rig to another can, in some cases, make it 
difficult to transfer lessons learned from one rig to another. In order for the experience and 
knowledge to be relevant the equipment has to be identical. The differences in the equipment 
caused by having different manufacturers can cause differences when operating and 
maintaining the same type of equipment from rig to rig.  
 
An advantage with these differences is the possibility to compare different manufacturers with 
regards to reliability and maintenance demands. For future builds and modifications this 
information can be used when selecting manufacturer of the different equipment.  
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3. Methodology 
 
In this study we have primarily used two different analysis methods. The main contribution to 
our data has been the different databases made available by NADL. Reports have been 
generated with the help of these databases and exported into excel or manually read for 
further analysis. In excel we have primarily used quantitative analysis techniques, by counting 
the amount of reports that fulfill certain, selected, requirements. 
 
To select the equipment groups used in this study we have done a quantitative analysis to see 
what equipment groups that are main contributors to downtime. We have also done a Pareto 
analysis in order to confirm our choice of equipment groups. The Pareto principle states that 
20% of the sources cause 80% of the problems (Pareto, 1896).  
 
Quantitative analysis has also been used to detect trends and to do most of the analyses based 
on data collected from the internal databases. 
 
In addition to the quantitative analysis we have also done a series of qualitative analyses. Here 
we have opened, read, interpreted and checked the reports for inconsistencies and 
crosschecked vital data against other available databases. 
 
To better understand the results we got from our analysis’s we did a series of interviews with 
both offshore and onshore personnel. The interviews were also used in order to find possible 
ways to improve the maintenance management. We also conferred and discussed our results 
with technical personnel and management while performing our analyses. 
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4. Data analysis and discussion 
 
In this chapter we will first present and briefly explain the different reporting tools and 
databases investigated in this thesis, then we will present our analysis`s and discuss the results 
of these. 
 
4.1 Reporting tools and databases 
 
Within the NADL organization they use several databases, each with their own main 
functions. For work orders and downtime reporting there are mainly three databases used, 
IFS, DODA and Synergi. Each of these databases uses unique reports and has different main 
purposes; they have been used for different reasons in this thesis, supplementing each other. 
 
 
4.1.1 IFS 
 
NADL uses IFS (www.ifsworld.com, 2011) for maintenance, procurement and logistics. In 
this study we have been looking at the maintenance part of IFS and especially the corrective 
maintenance reported in IFS. 
 
When this paper was written IFS had two options when first creating a corrective action, to 
create a fault report or to create a work request as seen in Figure 10. A fault report is chosen 
when the user want to report a fault or suspected fault on equipment while a work request is 
chosen when the user want to report a job needing to be done without there being a fault. The 
mandatory information needed in the system is depending on what option the user chooses. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Workflow for creating and planning of WO`s in IFS (Seadrill, 2011d) 
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When filling out a fault report the user have to fill out the following fields: 
- Date: The current date when the report is filled out. 
- Site: What rig the fault report is for. 
- Reported by: Who is making the report. 
- Maintenance Organization: Which department that should perform the work. 
- Object ID: The unique Object ID for the equipment that the fault report is made for. 
- Fault description: A short, but concise, description of the fault. 
- Priority: The priority is determined by use of Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Decision criteria’s for choice of priority when reporting CM in IFS (Seadrill, 2011d) 
Priority Health, safety and environment Material damage Operation 
1  Potential for serious damage 
 Safety-critical system out of service 
 Potential for fire in classified area 
 Potential for major emission/discharge to 
external environment 
 Considerable 
material 
damage  >1 
mill. NOK 
 Longer 
stop in 
operations 
2  Potential for injury requiring medical 
treatment 
 Limited impact on safety systems 
 No risk of fire in classified areas 
 Moderate potential risk of 
emission/discharge to external 
environment 
 Moderate 
material 
damage  
>100,000 <1 
mill. NOK 
 Shorter 
stop in 
operations 
3 & 4  No potential for injury 
 No impact on safety systems 
 No risk of fire 
 No potential risk of emission/discharge to 
external environment 
 Negligible 
material 
damage 
<100,000 NOK 
 No stop in 
operations 
 
 
When filling out a work request the user have to fill out the following fields: 
- Directive: Short description of the error 
- Maintenance organization: Which department that should perform the work 
- Reported by: Who is making the report 
 
There are in general few mandatory fields in IFS and the mandatory fields do not guarantee 
the quality of the filled in information. The mandatory fields in IFS only demands the user has 
to make some sort of input before he or she is allowed to save the sheet in IFS. The purpose of 
the mandatory fields is not for IFS to ensure the quality of the input, but to remind the user of 
what fields he or she have to fill out according to the internal routines. This removes the risk 
that a user forgets to fill in certain required fields, but it does however not remove the risk that 
the user might fill in poor/bad information. The user can write anything he or she wants in to 
the field and IFS will accept it; even a blank space will be accepted. 
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4.1.2 DODA 
 
DODA which stands for Daily Operations Database Application have been in use by NADL 
(previously Seadrill and Smedvig) since 2001. In DODA the different rigs report in vital data 
and comments regarding the day to day operation of the rig. The information reported in 
DODA is: 
- Well (Rig and Well): Information about installation, operator and well identification 
- AFE: Information regarding the well time budget 
- Technical Limit: Information about technically feasible AFE for the well 
- Section: Here data are entered about the well’s sections (depth etc.) 
- Daily Drill: Daily input of drilling and well data 
- Operations 24h: Daily input of drilling and well data 
- Drill Parameters: Daily input of operational data 
- Daily Marine: Daily input of marine data 
- Misc. Marine: Daily input of marine data 
- Helicopter Traffic: Daily helicopter traffic 
- Boat Movement: Daily vessel traffic 
- Bit: Information about drill bits 
- Week: Weekly input of operational information 
 
In this study we have mainly used DODA for its downtime reporting. All downtime for the 
different rigs are reported in DODA, regardless of the reason. It is divided into two main 
categories or codes, code 7 and code 8. All downtime that is planned and agreed upon with 
the contractor is reported as code 7, while all unplanned downtime is reported as code 8.  
 
The requirements and possibilities to use code 7 will depend on the contractual agreements 
between NADL and the contractor. There is normally a maximum amount of hours each 
month where the rig can have planned downtime without losing income. The time and length 
of the downtime must be reported to and agreed upon with the contractor a certain time prior 
to the downtime is to begin, typically at least 48 hours. 
 
 
4.1.3 Synergi 
 
Synergi has been in use by NADL for a number of years, but it has only been in use as a 
downtime reporting tool since February 2010. It is a risk management system aimed at 
increasing the HSEQ performance of the organization and to reduce related costs. 
The main purpose of Synergi within NADL is HSEQ reporting and tracking. 
 
Since we only are concerned with failures related to maintenance we will limit our use of 
Synergi to the reporting of incidents leading to downtime. 
 
The different rigs deliver detailed reports on every downtime incident daily, no later than the 
following day at 07:00hrs local time (Seadrill, 2011e). 
 
Each report shall contain (Seadrill, 2011e): 
- Equipment references: The equipment which is not functional and prevents 
operational performance must be specified.  
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- Economic loss: The economic loss must be indicated as the ”worst case”, meaning 
”day rate x days involved”. Unused repair hours credited shall not be taken into 
consideration in this respect. 
 
- Root Cause Analysis: The underlying root cause(s) for the incident shall be identified 
and reported. 
 
- Lessons Learned: Whenever a downtime incident takes place, it must be evaluated 
whether lessons learned can be transferred to other units. In order to ensure the 
experience transfer, the appropriate action for the other units in question must be 
outlined in the respective downtime report. 
 
The lessons learned transfer follows the guidelines presented in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11: Guideline for lessons learned transfer in Synergi  (Seadrill, 2011c) 
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4.2 Downtime 
 
In this paper we define downtime as any period of time where the rig is unable to follow its 
planned operation due to equipment and/or personnel failure. 
 
Optimizing the performance of an operation is always of great interest for a company. The 
balance between the increase in cost of maintenance and the loss of income due to downtime 
is often difficult to determine and is subject to many studies (Sattler and Reed, 2004, Khelifi, 
1999, Dew and Childers, 1989, Chapman and Brown, 2009, Ogidan and Coetzer, 1993, 
Wolter et al., 2006).  
 
In order to best estimate the maintenance optimization of equipment we need to look at the 
consequences of the failures, the possibility of the failures and root causes. This can be done 
with techniques such as FMECA (Military, 1984). An analysis of the equipment is normally 
done in order to determine the best suited maintenance program. This program is then 
modified as new knowledge is gathered during the lifetime of the equipment and/or similar 
equipment. These modifications of the maintenance program are done with the purpose of 
improving the balance between performance, maintenance and cost. Since the modifications 
rely on historical data it is important that the data collected over the lifetime of the equipment 
is managed and reported in the best way possible. The better the data is managed and reported 
the more likely we are to find the optimal balance between performance, reliability and cost.  
 
Since the use of reported data is essential in the making/modification of a maintenance 
program it is important that it is of good quality, covering the correct equipment groups and 
over as long time as possible. This is off course not possible to achieve the first time a system 
is used, but during the lifetime of the system such reports will most likely contribute to 
improved maintenance programs and cost savings for the company. 
 
 
4.2.1 Main contributors to downtime 
 
In order to find the equipment groups that causes the most downtime we have gathered data 
from Synergi and divided the different equipment on the MODU`s into groups, as described 
in chapter 3. By doing a quantitative analysis of the gathered data we found 15 groups that, 
combined, caused 94% of the downtime from January until October 2010. The contribution 
from each group is presented as percentage of total downtime in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Percentage of the total downtime in 2010 for the European rigs associated with different 
equipment groups 
Equipment group Percentage 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment 24 % 
Side thrusters 23 % 
Riser system incl. choke, kill and booster lines 16 % 
Blowout preventer control system 12 % 
Miscellaneous equipment for pipe/tubular handling 4 % 
Drill floor tubular handling equipment 3 % 
Drawworks & Machinery 2 % 
Derrick mounted vertical pipe handling system 2 % 
Windlasses with chain stoppers, rollers, etc 2 % 
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Mud Supply 1 % 
Travelling equipment 1 % 
Drilling control 1 % 
Tensioning system 1 % 
Overhead cranes 1 % 
Choke and kill system incl. mud/gas separator 1 % 
Total 94 % 
 
Here we observe that side thrusters caused 23% of the downtime, after consulting with 
qualified personnel we found this to be an unexpected high percentage. A closer look at the 
collected data reveals that one rig, West Navigator, had significant and uncharacteristic 
problems with the side thrusters in 2010. Over a longer period of time the side thrusters will 
most likely be the cause of a far lower percentage of the total downtime. As further analysis 
will show the root cause for the downtime caused by the side thrusters are not maintenance 
related, but design related, and we will therefore not go further into this discussion. 
 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 includes all groups having caused downtime in 2010 and show how 
many percent of the total downtime the different equipment groups are responsible for and. 
This is based on data collected from MODU`s located in Europe and in the Eastern 
Hemisphere. We chose to include data from rigs located in the Eastern Hemisphere to better 
compensate for the short period of time the data covers. 
 
By doing a Pareto analysis (Pareto, 1896) in Figure 13 we can see that the downtime 
contribution follows the Pareto principle with approximately 20% of the equipment groups 
contributing with 80% of the downtime. In theory one can eliminate 80% of the current 
downtime by avoiding downtime in five equipment groups. 
 
 
Figure 12: Downtime percentage of equipment groups Europe Vs Eastern Hemisphere 2010 
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Figure 13: Pareto analysis of the average downtime for rigs in Europe and Eastern hemisphere 2010 by 
equipment groups 
 
The cost of the downtime related to equipment groups, estimated as loss of income, is shown 
in Table 10. This table is based on data collected from the European rigs only. 
 
Over a period of 10 months these selected 15 groups have been the cause of a combined loss 
off income due to downtime of almost 48 million US dollars.  Here we clearly see that four 
groups have very high downtime costs compared to the rest of the groups. These four groups 
contribute with approximately 40 million US dollars in downtime cost alone, over 80% of the 
total downtime cost for the 15 groups. Since the cost is estimated as loss of income we get the 
same top groups here as if we look at the downtime hours for the European rigs in Figure 12. 
 
Table 10: Loss of income due to downtime from January until October 2010 
Equipment group Percentage USD 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment 22% 10 420 776 
Side thrusters 21% 10 157 656 
Riser system incl. choke, kill and booster lines 26% 12 523 146 
Blowout preventer control system 16% 7 605 893 
Miscellaneous equipment for pipe/tubular handling 4% 1 915 437 
Drill floor tubular handling equipment 2% 1 027 840 
Drawworks & Machinery   ~1% 646 466 
Derrick mounted vertical pipe handling system ~1% 704 200 
Windlasses with chain stoppers, rollers, etc ~1% 730 000 
Mud Supply ~1% 696 850 
Travelling equipment ~1% 214 500 
Drilling control ~1% 236 375 
Tensioning system ~1% 593 437 
Overhead cranes ~1% 185 000 
Choke and kill system incl. mud/gas separator ~1% 242 793 
Total 100% 47 900 369 
 
When further investigating the collected data on downtime during the last year we are able to 
find the root causes for the downtime. Table 11 shows how many percent of the total number 
of downtime events the different root causes are responsible for, Table 12 shows how much of 
0,00 %
10,00 %
20,00 %
30,00 %
40,00 %
50,00 %
60,00 %
70,00 %
80,00 %
90,00 %
100,00 %
0,00 %
5,00 %
10,00 %
15,00 %
20,00 %
25,00 %
30,00 %
35,00 %
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
Percentage
Cumulative
 28 
the total estimated cost related to downtime the different root causes are responsible for. Since 
the downtime cost is directly related to the downtime hours we can use the downtime costs in 
Figure 18 as an estimator for the downtime hours. 
 
Table 11: Root cause analysis of downtime events from January until October 2010 
Root Cause Events Percentage 
Poor Maintenance 99 35,6 
Poor Design 51 18,3 
Poor Quality 47 16,9 
Error of Use 31 11,2 
Procedure 12 4,3 
Equipment Failure 8 2,9 
Other 30 10,8 
 
One can see that the root causes with the most events not necessarily contribute with the most 
downtime; there is no direct connection between high frequency and high cost. 
 
Table 12: Root cause analysis of downtime cost from January until October 2010 
Root Cause USD Percentage 
Poor Quality 12 798 898 26,6 
Poor Design 11 564 074 24 
Equipment Failure 10 447 956 21,7 
Error of Use 6 223 565 12,9 
Poor Maintenance 4 837 774 10,1 
Procedure 209 562 0,4 
Other 2 023 960 4,2 
 
We can see that poor maintenance is identified as the main root cause in 35% of the events 
leading to downtime. When we look at the cost of the related downtime, these events do 
however only count for 10% of the total costs. There might be a series of reasons for this, but 
when we look at the different root causes and their downtime, the most likely reason is that 
the repair time/downtime due to poor maintenance is less than for other groups. Further 
analyses of the downtime reveals this to be true as can be seen in Table 13. The difference in 
percentages from Table 12 and Table 13 is caused by the differences in day rates from 
contract to contract. 
 
Table 13: Root cause analysis of downtime from January until October 2010 
Root Cause Hours Percentage 
Poor Quality 553,25 27,3 
Poor Design 392,25 19,4 
Equipment Failure 455,15 22,5 
Error of Use 291,75 14,4 
Poor Maintenance 219,5 10,8 
Procedure 10 0,5 
Other 102,25 5,1 
 
Since this paper is about maintenance we are not interested in downtime that is not related to 
this. Further analysis of the downtime reports gives us Table 14, which shows us how many 
downtime events the different equipment groups have had that can be related to insufficient 
maintenance. 
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Table 14: Number of events causing downtime as a result of insufficient maintenance and by equipment 
group 
 Insufficient Maintenance Other 
Rotary table, top drive and 
associated equipment 
17 31 
Side thrusters 0 1 
Riser system incl. choke, kill and 
booster lines 
4 13 
Blowout preventer control system 1 5 
Miscellaneous equipment for 
pipe/tubular handling 
4 8 
Drill floor tubular handling 
equipment 
14 22 
Drawworks & machinery 6 4 
Derrick mounted vertical pipe 
handling system 
15 23 
Windlasses with chain stoppers, 
rollers, etc. 
0 1 
Mud supply 4 9 
Travelling equipment 0 2 
Drilling control 2 10 
Tensioning systems 0 2 
Overhead cranes 6 3 
Choke and kill system incl. mud/gas 
separator 
1 4 
 
Some of the equipment groups have not experienced any downtime that can be related to 
insufficient maintenance and we will therefore exclude them from further analyses. Further 
studies will be done on the 11 equipment groups listed in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Our chosen 11 equipment groups for further studies and the related SFI group code 
Equipment Group SFI group code 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment 313 
Riser system incl. choke, kill and booster lines 335 
Blowout preventer control system 332 
Miscellaneous equipment for pipe/tubular handling 347 
Drill floor tubular handling equipment 342 
Drawworks & machinery 312 
Derrick mounted vertical pipe handling system 341 
Mud supply 325 
Drilling control 311 
Overhead cranes 362 
Choke and kill system incl. mud/gas separator 336 
 
Looking at the reported costs for the downtime caused by these 11 groups in Synergi gives us 
Table 16. These reported costs in Synergi do however only take into consideration the loss of 
income due to the downtime and is calculated as described in chapter 4.1.3. It is however a 
good indication of the severities of a downtime event caused by the different equipment 
groups.  
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Based on these numbers we can see that the downtime events in the Rotary table, top drive 
and associated equipment group is the most expensive, with an average cost per event of 
167 718 US dollars. The least expensive group is the Drawworks & machinery group, with an 
average cost per event of 9 630 US dollars, less than 6% of the most expensive group.  
The total costs of downtime related to insufficient maintenance for all groups is 4 837 774 US 
dollars, our chosen 11 groups contributed with 4 397 372 US dollars, or 91%, of this. 
 
Table 16: Cost of downtime related to insufficient maintenance sorted by equipment groups 
 Total costs Average cost per event 
Rotary table, top drive and 
associated equipment 
2 851 213 USD 167 718 USD 
Riser system incl. choke, 
kill and booster lines 
97 500 USD 24 375 USD 
Blowout preventer control 
system 
20 000 USD 20 000 USD 
Miscellaneous equipment 
for pipe/tubular handling 
78 000 USD 19 500 USD 
Drill floor tubular handling 
equipment 
363 187 USD 25 941 USD 
Drawworks & machinery 57 781 USD 9 630 USD 
Derrick mounted vertical 
pipe handling system 
246 150 USD 16 410 USD 
Mud supply 481 500 USD 120 375 USD 
Drilling control 42 250 USD 21 125 USD 
Overhead cranes 147 500 USD 24 583 USD 
Choke and kill system incl. 
mud/gas separator 
12 291 USD 12 291 USD 
TOTAL 4 397 372 USD 59 423 USD 
 
If we use Pareto Analysis (Pareto, 1896) to identify the important causes we get different 
outcomes depending on how we do our analysis. The Pareto analysis says that “80% of the 
problems are produced by 20% of the causes”. Accordingly, if we look at the number of 
events and ignore the cost we get Figure 14 where all equipment groups left of 
“Miscellaneous equipment for pipe/tubular handling” is considered important. 
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Figure 14: Pareto analysis of equipment groups causing failures, based on percentage of total events 
 
If we look at the cost, and ignore the number of events, instead we get Figure 15, here fever 
equipment groups will be considered as important. Only 3 groups will here be considered as 
important, as opposed to 8 groups in Figure 14. We see that our main contributor, both in 
number of events and cost, is rotary table, top drive and associated equipment, contributing 
with almost 20% of the events and over 60% of the cost. This information is of importance 
when making adjustments to maintenance programs and focusing attention on the right 
equipment. Excluding equipment groups based on the Pareto analysis after already narrowing 
down our equipment groups by root cause and overall contribution to downtime will however 
not be done in this study. But this analysis clearly shows that improving the maintenance and 
reducing the downtime for the Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group is most 
likely to reduce the overall downtime cost most of the groups studied. 
 
 
Figure 15: Pareto analysis of equipment groups causing failures, based on percentage of total cost 
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4.2.2 Downtime due to 3rd party suppliers 
 
When looking at the total downtime of NADL`s rigs it can be of interest to know how much 
of the downtime that are caused by 3
rd
 party suppliers. A good example is the problems West 
Navigator had in late 2009 and the beginning of 2010 with their thrusters. The thruster 
problems were the cause of 23% of the total downtime for the European rigs in 2010 as shown 
in Table 9. The reports identify the root cause of this event as poor design which the supplier 
was responsible for. While there might be no way of avoiding this kind of failures totally, it 
does highlight the importance of inspection and quality control of 3
rd
 party suppliers and 
equipment.  
 
Analyzing the reports from 2010 and identifying the downtime events where the root cause 
can be directly related to 3
rd
 party supplier failures gives us Table 17. We can, for 2010, see 
that the 3
rd
 party suppliers are causing 68% of the total downtime for the European rigs. One 
can however argue that this numbers are uncharacteristically high due to the short time span 
and the problems West Navigator had in January. If we, for argument sake, ignore January 
and only take into consideration the downtime between February and October we find that the 
3
rd
 party suppliers were the cause of 378 of a total of 962 downtime hours. That is the 
equivalent of almost 40% and clearly shows that the failures from 3
rd
 party suppliers cannot 
be ignored when trying to reduce the total downtime. 
 
The failures caused by 3
rd
 party suppliers are typically poor design and/or poor quality and are 
difficult, if not impossible, to avoid with maintenance after installation. To reduce this 
downtime, preventive measures can be taken, such as increased inspection and control of both 
delivered equipment and manufacturers.  
 
The downtime due to 3
rd
 party suppliers is higher than the downtime directly related to poor 
or insufficient maintenance and, in our opinion, more difficult to reduce. The main reason is 
that maintenance is something the organization can monitor and improve continuously 
internally while design and quality problems must be detected by inspection prior to 
installation.   
 
These figures does however indicate that the downtime due to 3
rd
 party suppliers is something 
NADL should look closer at, perhaps increase their focus and resources used on inspection 
and control of purchased equipment and services. 
 
Table 17: Downtime of the European rigs sorted by month and responsible part 
  NADL 3rd Party Total 
January 2010 3,5 877,4 880,9 
February 2010 3 18,25 21,25 
March 2010 18 27,25 45,25 
April 2010 14,25 51,5 65,75 
May 2010 6,75 14,25 21 
June 2010 200,25 113,25 313,5 
July 2010 76,5 84,5 161 
August 2010 10,75 17 27,75 
September 2010 21 28,5 49,5 
October 2010 233,75 23,5 257,25 
Total 587,75 1255,4 1843,15 
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4.2.3 Trends in downtime 
 
Average downtime in 2010 was 1 hour and 15 minutes per rig each day for NADL in Europe, 
approximately 5% downtime and 95% uptime. The numbers are similar for the eastern 
hemisphere in 2010. The downtime for 2010 does not take into account November and 
December and is very much influenced by West Navigators side thruster problem during the 
year in Europe. 
 
Before 2010 there have not been any good systems within NADL to look at the causes of 
downtime. The downtime have been tracked by the use of DODA and to some extent IFS.  
 
By gathering and analyzing the number of IFS reports that are marked as causing downtime 
we get Figure 16. From this figure one can see that there has been a decrease in downtime 
events since 2006 according to IFS. One of the reasons for this reduction might be the 
increase in experience with the different equipment. This is likely to improve maintenance 
and thereby reduce the number of events reported in IFS causing downtime. Other possible 
reasons are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Average reported downtime events in IFS per rig per year sorted by equipment group 
 
When we look at the yearly downtime since 2005 we can see that most rigs have a decreasing 
trend. As we can see from figure Figure 17; West Alpha, West Venture and West Epsilon all 
operate with a yearly downtime in the region between 0 and 800 hours/year, with an average 
below 500 hours/year. West Navigator is the main contributor to downtime most of the years 
and had an increasing downtime trend from 2005 to 2008, in 2009 there were a significant 
decrease in the downtime, but the downtime more than doubled again in 2010. In 2008 West 
Navigator had around ten times as many downtime hours as West Alpha and West Epsilon. 
The downtime caused by West Navigator is so much higher on average than the rest of the 
rigs that we when we look at the average downtime for all rigs from 2005 until 2010 the curve 
shape follow West Navigators downtime trends as seen in Figure 18. 
 
 
Downtime trends
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
E
v
e
n
ts
Rotary table, top drive and associated
equipment
Riser system incl. Choke, kill and booster lines
Blowout preventer control system
Misc equpiment for pipe/tubular handling
Drill floor tubular handling equipment
Drawworks & machinery
Derrick mounted vertical pipe handling system
Mud supply
Drilling control
Overhead cranes
Choke and kill system incl. Mud/gas seperator
 34 
 
Figure 17: Historical downtime for the European rigs 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Historical average downtime per rig for NADL`s European rigs 
 
Comparing the downtime hours reported in DODA with the number of downtime events 
reported in IFS we can find no obvious relation. While there is a significant decrease in the 
number of downtime events reported from 2006 to 2007, there is an increase in downtime in 
the same period. If we choose to ignore the downtime contributed by West Navigator we do 
however see a slight reduction in the average downtime from 2005 until 2010.  
 
It can seem like NADL have successfully managed to reduce the downtime events causing 
little downtime, reducing the total number of events without reducing the overall downtime 
hours to the same degree.  
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4.2.4 Planned vs. unplanned downtime 
 
There are two different types of downtime for NADL`s rig; planned and unplanned. There are 
certain criteria’s that needs to be fulfilled in order for the downtime to be reported/categorized 
as planned. The two main criteria’s are: 
 
1. The contractor have to be notified a certain time prior to the downtime 
2. The total planned downtime must be within an agreed upon limit between NADL 
and the contractor 
 
The loss of income due to planned maintenance are subject to contractual agreements, but are 
always lower than for unplanned maintenance and can be non-existing. 
 
Unplanned downtime is all the downtime that does not fulfill the planned downtime criteria’s 
and will have more severe economic consequences. For such downtime there will be a loss of 
income estimated as the contractual day rate times the length of the downtime. 
 
In DODA the downtime is reported as either code 7 or code 8, where code 7 is planned 
downtime and code 8 is unplanned downtime. Doing an analysis of the downtime reported in 
DODA since 2005 under code 7 and code 8 for the different rigs gives us Figure 19. 
 
It is interesting to note that the rigs with the least planned maintenance also are the one with 
the most unplanned downtime. West Navigator has the most unplanned maintenance all years, 
except for 2005, and they have the least planned maintenance the same years. 
 
 
Figure 19: Historical unplanned (code 8) vs planned (code 7) downtime for the European rigs 
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We rarely see that there have been more planned than unplanned downtime, only in 6 out of 
21 studied years this is the case. West Epsilon has had a decreasing trend in planned 
downtime while having a slightly increasing trend in unplanned downtime. The opposite is 
the case for West Venture and West Alpha, both having an increasing trend in planned 
downtime while reducing the unplanned maintenance. Since West Phoenix only has been in 
operation since the end of 2008 we do not have enough data to do any analysis of the trends 
over time for this rig. 
 
When there is an increase in planned downtime there seems to be, on average, an even higher 
decrease in unplanned downtime. This can indicate that the planned downtime not only 
replace the unplanned downtime, but also reduces the overall downtime. 
 
It is however important to remember that the criteria’s for planned maintenance are subject to 
contractual agreements. The reported numbers alone will therefore not give a total and correct 
picture; it will only give us a rough idea of the trends over time and relations with the 
unplanned maintenance. 
 
 
4.3 Non-critical failures 
 
If we look at the reported corrective actions in IFS on our selected 11 equipment groups we 
get Figure 20. One can here see that there is a slight decrease in reported corrective actions in 
IFS starting from 2005 to 2006, after 2006 most groups seems to have a stable number of 
corrective actions each year. There are some similarities to the trend that we can see in Figure 
16 which is the number of reported downtime actions reported in IFS. The decrease in reports 
is however not as clear and comes a little prior to the decrease in Figure 16.  
 
 
 
Figure 20: Average amount corrective actions reported in IFS per rig per year (Appendix A – Corrective 
Actions reported in IFS) 
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4.3.1 Failures that could be critical 
 
By failures that could be critical we mean failures that would cause the rig to experience 
downtime if they had occurred in another phase of the operation. An example to illustrate this 
is if the rig already is unable to perform its intended operation and the rotary table experiences 
a failure. The failure in the rotary table is corrected before the initial cause of the downtime 
and therefore doesn’t affect the experienced downtime. This failure would have been critical 
and caused downtime on its own if it had occurred during a drilling operation. 
 
One way of possibly identifying these hidden downtime events are to look at the reported 
corrective actions in IFS during periods of downtime. Table 18 shows reported corrective 
actions in IFS during periods of downtime. 
 
Table 18: Reported corrective actions in IFS during downtime 
 
 
From this table we can see that there are a total of 1083 reported actions that possibly could 
have given downtime. Since the no-downtime reports in IFS don’t contain any information 
regarding the potential consequences of the failure there is no easy way to find how many of 
these 1083 reported actions that could have this potential. To identify the actions with such a 
potential one have to manually read every report and interpret the information, which in most 
cases is insufficient. When studying the reports further in this thesis we found that the 
information given in each report was insufficient in order for us to make any conclusion on 
the potential of the failure. We can only note that there is a high amount of reported corrective 
actions on the days that have registered downtime and that some of this might have led to 
downtime.  
 
If one are to study this further the company need to involve key technical personnel with the 
knowledge needed to interpret the IFS reports. But, even with the right knowledge, the lack of 
information in the reports will make it hard, if not impossible, to make such a study of quality. 
 
 
4.3.2 Discussion of potential consequences 
 
It is, in our opinion, very important to identify not only the occurred consequences of the 
failure, but also the potential consequences. The same failure can be critical in one phase of 
the operation and non-critical in another phase, despite the operation of the equipment itself 
being similar. Since the operation of the equipment is similar the failures that are classified as 
non-critical could just as well have been critical. By ignoring this potential consequence of the 
 IFS reports on days with registered downtime 
 Reported as downtime Reported as no-downtime Other Total 
Alpha 3 97 11 111 
Navigator 62 393 10 465 
Epsilon 10 203 1 214 
Venture 0 143 13 156 
Phoenix 13 179 33 225 
Total 88 1015 68 1171 
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failure we get a wrong picture of the probability of downtime due to this failure. When setting 
up a maintenance program we balance between the cost and savings of the maintenance. It is 
therefore important that we get as correct as possible probabilities when we calculate the 
potential savings associated with the increase in maintenance. This is not only limited to the 
cost directly related to down-time, but also the indirect losses caused by loss in reputation and 
similar. 
 
 
4.4 Planned Maintenance 
 
When we look at the reported planned maintenance in IFS from 2004 until 2010 we get 
Figure 21. The yearly number of reports is here quite constant for each equipment group 
throughout the studied period of time.  
 
There does not seem to be any connection between the number of corrective actions and 
planned maintenance reported in IFS. One amount of planned maintenance can have very 
different amount of corrective actions in the same period of time. 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Average number of planned maintenance reported in IFS per rig per year 
 
The planned maintenance does not seem to have affected the maintenance related downtime 
either. As shown previously there have been a decrease in maintenance related downtime, but 
we cannot see any decrease or increase in planned maintenance. The same applies for the 
number of downtime events reported in IFS where we could see a clear decreasing trend after 
2006 in Figure 16, which cannot be related to any changes in Figure 21.  
 
Based on these numbers there seem to have been little changes in the maintenance schedules 
for the rigs. It does not seem like the changes in downtime can be contributed to any changes 
in the frequency of the maintenance performed. 
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4.5 Impact of major overhauls 
 
In order to look at the impact on downtime and failure frequency from major overhauls we 
have decided to look at two different rigs before and after their last major overhauls. The first 
rig we will look into is the West Alpha which had a major overhaul from 22.09.2009 until 
24.10.2009. We will look at how the failure rate, spare part usage and downtime were before 
this overhaul and how it has been after. 
 
The overhauls are normally done in connection with classification of the rig and the frequency 
is dictated by local laws and legislations. The rigs in our study follows DNV`s rules for 
offshore classification (DNV, 2011a) and the frequency dictated by it. The rigs in our case 
studies have been classed every 5
th
 year. NADL is free to increase the frequency of these 
major overhauls, but they cannot decrease it and extend the period between the classifications. 
 
 
4.5.1 West Alpha case study 
 
Starting with the corrective actions reported the last year before last major overhaul we get 
Figure 22. In the same period the rig had a downtime as shown in Figure 23. The average 
downtime the last year before the overhaul was approximately 41 hours, and the average 
monthly reported actions are shown in Table 19. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Number of corrective actions reported in IFS from September 2008 until last major overhaul 
in September 2009 for West Alpha 
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Figure 23: Downtime for West Alpha last year before last major overhaul 
 
 
Table 19: Average monthly reported corrective actions for West Alpha from September 2008 until August 
2009 
Equipment group Corrective actions 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment 4,3 
Riser system incl. choke, kill and booster lines 1,8 
Blowout preventer control system 5,9 
Miscellaneous equipment for pipe/tubular handling 0,9 
Drill floor tubular handling equipment 1,6 
Drawworks & machinery 2,0 
Derrick mounted vertical pipe handling system 3,5 
Mud supply 2,5 
Drilling control 1,0 
Overhead cranes 1,8 
Choke and kill system incl. mud/gas separator 1,3 
Total average 2,4 
 
When we look at the first year after the last major overhaul we get a different picture. First we 
can look at the average monthly reported actions, shown in Table 20. The average monthly 
reported corrective actions have decreased from 2,4 prior to the major overhaul to 1,6 after the 
major overhaul. This is a 25% reduction and if we look into the different groups we can see a 
good decrease in the most critical equipment. The BOP system which is critical with regards 
to economics and HSE have a decrease in reported corrective actions from 5,9 to 2,7, which is 
the same as a 54% reduction. 
 
Table 20: Average monthly reported corrective actions for West Alpha from November 2009 until 
October 2010 
Equipment group Corrective actions 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment 3,3 
Riser system incl. choke, kill and booster lines 1 
Blowout preventer control system 2,7 
Miscellaneous equipment for pipe/tubular handling 0,9 
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Drill floor tubular handling equipment 1,3 
Drawworks & machinery 0,9 
Derrick mounted vertical pipe handling system 2,6 
Mud supply 2,6 
Drilling control 0,8 
Overhead cranes 0,6 
Choke and kill system incl. mud/gas separator 1,4 
Total average 1,6 
 
There is however hard to find any obvious trends in the reported corrective actions month for 
month both before and after the overhaul. If we compare Figure 22 with the graph made with 
data collected after the overhaul in Figure 24 we can see that there is an overall decrease, as 
we also could see from Table 20. But there are no obvious changes in trends month by month 
for the different equipment. 
 
 
Figure 24: Historical corrective actions reported in IFS from November 2009 until October 2010 sorted by 
equipment groups and consequences 
 
The downtime after the overhaul is shown in Figure 25 and the monthly average was 
approximately 14 hours a month. This is a significant decrease compared to the last year 
before the overhaul, when it the monthly average downtime was 41 hours. It is a decrease in 
downtime of 27 hours a month or approximately 65%. 
 
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
12,00
14,00
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
e
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
e
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
D
o
w
n
ti
m
e
E
v
e
n
ts
T
o
ta
l
E
v
e
n
ts
Rotary
table, top
drive and
associated
Riser
system
incl.
choke, kill
Blowout
preventer
control
system
Miscellaneous
equipment for
pipe/tubular
handling
Drill floor
tubular
handling
equipment
Drawworks
&
machinery
Derrick
mounted
vertical
pipe
Mud
supply
Drilling
control
Overhead
cranes
Choke and
kill system
incl.
mud/gas
nov.09
des.09
jan.10
feb.10
mar.10
apr.10
mai.10
jun.10
jul.10
aug.10
sep.10
okt.10
 42 
 
Figure 25: Historical downtime for West Alpha after last major overhaul 
 
The last year before a major overhaul there might be an increase in maintenance and planned 
downtime in order to make the rig ready for the overhaul and following classing. But, as we 
can see from  
Table 21 the difference is more or less equally big for both planned and unplanned downtime 
before and after the overhaul. 
 
Table 21: Planned and unplanned downtime before and after West Alpha’s last major overhaul 
 Before After 
Code 7 (planned downtime) 22,5 hours/month 8 hours/month 
Code 8 (unplanned downtime) 18,5 hours/month 6 hours/month 
Total 41 hours/month 14 hours/month 
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4.5.2 West Venture case study 
 
West Venture was docked for major overhaul and classing in 2005, returning to normal 
operation in May 2005 and the next major overhaul and classing was in 2010.  
We have looked at how the downtime and failures have been in the period between these 
overhauls, from May 2005 until the end of 2009. 
 
After each major overhaul we would expect the rig to perform at its maximum and the 
downtime and downtime events to be at its minimum. As time goes and we get closer to the 
next major overhaul we would expect an increase in downtime and downtime events, with a 
peak just before being overhauled. Some of this expected pattern could be observed in the 
West Alpha case study in the previous chapter. 
 
When we analyze the downtime data, collected from DODA, for the period after West 
Venture`s overhaul in 2005 we get Figure 20 and Figure 27. Here we can see a slight decrease 
in the monthly average downtime, which is unexpected. If we look at average downtime the 
first 6 months after the overhaul in 2005 and the last six months in 2009 we get an average of 
around 18 hours/month in both periods. The average monthly downtime from the overhaul 
until 2010 is approximately 30 hours/month, but if we choose to ignore the months with un-
characteristic high downtime (above 60 hours/month) we get an average of 18 hours/month.  
 
 
 
Figure 26: West Venture monthly average downtime sorted by Code and month 
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Figure 27: West Venture 6 month average downtime 
 
There is a total of 6 out of 55 months (11%) with what we define as uncharacteristic high 
downtime, contributing with a total of 626 hours of downtime or 38% of the total downtime. 
Table 22 lists the uncharacteristic months and the corresponding data; if we compare this to 
the rest of our gathered data we get Table 23.  
 
Table 22: Downtime in hours versus number of downtime events for months with uncharacteristic high 
downtime 
Month Downtime (hours) Number of downtime events 
December 2005 129 21 
November 2006 128 43 
January 2008 115 26 
February 2008 63 27 
May 2008 115 12 
June 2008 76 25 
Total 626 154 
 
 
Table 23: Average monthly downtime versus average monthly number of downtime events from January 
2005 to December 2009 compared to average for months with downtime exceeding 60 hours 
 Average monthly downtime 
(hours) 
Average monthly number 
of downtime events 
June 2005 – December 2009 30 hours 13 
Uncharacteristic Months 
(downtime over 60 hours) 
104 hours 26 
 
We have over three times as high average monthly downtime, but only twice the amount of 
events in the uncharacteristic months as in the rest of the period. When we look closer at the 
reports we can also see that most of the events in the uncharacteristic months are directly 
related with the same cause. We can also see that in May 2008 there was performed planned 
maintenance on BOP causing most of the downtime this month.  
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If we combine these findings with the trends in downtime we found earlier it seems like 
frequency of less severe downtime events have been quite constant in the entire period. The 
reason for the slightly decreasing downtime trend we discovered in Figure 26 is the 
uncharacteristic months. These uncharacteristic months have downtimes that, in large parts, 
are caused by a single root event with several directly related events caused by this root event. 
It also seems like these uncharacteristic months and events are just as likely to occur straight 
after a major overhaul as four years after and straight before next overhaul. 
 
If we look at the amount of reported corrective actions in IFS from the overhaul in 2005 until 
2010 we get Figure 28. There are no evident trends here; the monthly number of reports 
fluctuates randomly around an average of 14 reports a month. If anything, there is a slight 
decrease in the number of reports, but this decrease is too small and the fluctuations too big 
for us to say it is anything else than random. 
 
 
Figure 28: Corrective actions reported in IFS from June 2005 until December 2009 for West Venture 
 
Based on these findings it is hard to determine how much of an impact the major overhaul has 
had on the downtime of West Venture. It does however seem like the period between the 
overhauls could have been longer since we are unable to find any obvious changes in failure 
frequency or downtime between the overhauls. 
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4.6 Spare part consumption 
 
In order to look for any correlations between spare part consumption and downtime we have 
analyzed the spare part consumption on the European rigs for the 11 SFI groups causing the 
most downtime. 
 
When we got the raw data from NADL regarding spare part consumption we soon discovered 
that a large percentage of the spare part orders were missing information on price, making the 
statistics subject to large uncertainties. However, the percentage of spare part orders lacking 
information about price seems to be fairly constant through time; therefore it can be used to 
look for any trends over time. The fraction of orders lacking information also seems to be 
similar across the different SFI groups. Therefore we conclude that the data can be used to 
compare the average cost of spare parts for each group against each other. 
 
The overall spare part consumption measured by its cost has been decreasing since January 
2008 as we can see from Figure 29. There are two months that stand out in this figure; April 
2009 and August 2009, with respectively 12.1 mill. NOK and 11 mill. NOK.  
 
 
 
Figure 29: Total cost of spareparts on the european rigs for the top 11 SFI groups 
 
For April 2009 10.8 mill NOK of the 12.1 mill NOK are caused by one single SFI group; 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment, as shown in Figure 30. This group also 
caused 24% of the total downtime in from January to October in 2009. 
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Figure 30: Total cost of spareparts on the european rigs for Rotary table, top drive and associated 
equipment 
 
 
For August 2009 9.6 mill. NOK of the 11 mill NOK are caused by equipment in the riser 
system incl. Choke, kill and booster lines, as shown in Figure 31. This group caused 16% of 
the total downtime between January and October in 2009. 
 
 
Figure 31: Total cost of spare parts on the European rigs for Riser system incl. Choke, kill and booster 
lines 
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The overall spare part cost for the different rigs are shown in Table 24. Here we can see that 
West Navigator have almost three times as high total costs as the second worst rig. If we look 
at the downtime of the different rigs we can see that West Navigator is dominant, with over 8 
times as high downtime as the second worst rig for 2008 and almost twice as high downtime 
as the second worst for 2009.  
 
We were not able to get a hold of the correct spare costs for West Venture when this thesis 
was written. 
 
Table 24: Spare part costs from January 2008 until December 2010 
 West 
Navigator 
West 
Alpha 
West 
Phoenix 
West 
Venture 
West 
Epsilon 
Rotary table, top drive and 
associated equipment 1 995 918 788 375 11 351 453 0 1 381035 
Riser system incl. Choke, kill and 
booster lines 12 498 124 3 721 756 493 22 374 1 
Blowout preventer control system 10 725 641 3 089 064 80 825 257 655 146 668 
Miscellaneous equipment for 
pipe/tubular handling 2 280 136 87 003 17 172 0 2 957 
Drill floor tubular handling 
equipment 547 919 42 267 16 783 0 185 711 
Drawworks & machinery 358 972 649 033 0 0 365 442 
Derrick mounted vertical pipe 
handling system 341 131 345 607 404 980 0 334 496 
Mud supply 1 419 603 1 057 391 920 988 0 1 364 950 
Drilling control 298 258 273 005 184 229 0 411 509 
Overhead cranes 130 207 220 231 419 615 0 47 500 
Choke and kill system incl. 
mud/gas seperator 7 628 725 201 909 166 151 0 236 491 
Total 
38 224 639 10 475 645 13 562 689 280 029 
 
4 476 764 
 
Looking at the total spare part costs for our chosen SFI groups and comparing them to the 
group’s downtime and loss of income due to downtime between January and October 2010 
we get Table 25. There is no evident link between the spare part cost and downtime cost for 
the different groups that we can see in this period. 
 
Table 25: Downtime vs. spare part cost for the European rigs between January 2010 and October 2010 
 Downtime Spare part cost Downtime cost (loss 
of income) 
Rotary table, top drive 
and associated 
equipment 
456 hours 1 152 197 NOK 58 356 346 NOK 
Riser system incl. Choke, 
kill and booster lines 
301 hours 235 247 NOK 70 129 618 NOK 
Blowout preventer control 
system 
225 hours 772 014 NOK 42 593 001 NOK 
Miscellaneous equipment 
for pipe/tubular handling 
79 hours 283 448 NOK 10 726 447 NOK 
Drill floor tubular handling 
equipment 
47 hours 201 104 NOK 5 755 904 NOK 
Drawworks & machinery 38 hours 120 247 NOK 3 620 210 NOK 
Derrick mounted vertical 
pipe handling system 
42 hours 510 217 NOK 3 943 520 NOK 
Mud supply 24 hours 2 364 872 NOK 3 902 360 NOK 
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Drilling control 14 hours 139 904 NOK 1 323 700 NOK 
Overhead cranes 15 hours 138 406 NOK 1 036 000 NOK 
Choke and kill system 
incl. mud/gas seperator 
14 hours 1 788 864 NOK 1 359 641 NOK 
 
When we look at the monthly spare part cost versus the monthly downtime cost between 
January and October 2010 we end up with Figure 32. There are no sign of any correlation 
between the spare part consumption and downtime cost here either.  
 
 
Figure 32: Spare part cost vs downtime cost between January 2010 and October 2010 
 
We find it hard to make any conclusions about the influence changes in spare part 
consumption have on the downtime based on these results. We do however notice that three 
groups stand out, both with regards to downtime and spare part cost; the Rotary table, top 
drive and associated equipment group, the Riser system incl. choke, kill and booster lines 
group and the Blowout preventer control system group. These groups caused a total of 52% of 
the total downtime between January and October 2010, and 68% of the spare part costs when 
we limit the total cost to the cost contributed by our chosen 11 groups. 
 
Despite not being able to see any corresponding trends in spare part cost and downtime events 
over time, we can see that the equipment causing the most downtime also have the highest 
spare part costs over time. 
 
We also see that most of the spare part cost for these groups is concentrated over short periods 
of time and that the rest of the time the spare part cost is fairly equal to the other groups 
studied. This pattern is the same for the downtime caused by these three groups. Based on this 
we find it fair to assume that single events are likely to lead costly failures or other need for 
maintenance. Most of the other groups seem to have a more constant monthly spare part cost. 
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5. Data Quality 
 
In order to successfully utilize gathered maintenance date from reports in the different 
databases the reports have to be of a certain quality and fulfill certain requirements. As a 
minimum we would say that one have to be able to easily identify the equipment, nature of 
the failure, work done, resources used, root cause and consequences experienced when we 
talk about maintenance related reports. The requirements to the content of the reports will 
depend on the intended use of the report. 
 
We also have to take into consideration the resources needed, the personnel involved and the 
human-machine interface. Setting requirements to the content of the reports alone will not 
guarantee the data collected to be of a certain standard. We believe it is important to; 
- make sure that enough resources are in place, 
- that one has the support of the reporting personnel,  
- that the personnel have the competence needed,  
- and that the interface used is easy and understandable for all parties involved. 
 
In this chapter we will share our experiences with the quality of the data from the three 
different databases used in this thesis. We have looked at the how well the reports fulfill the 
existing requirements within NADL and how well the reports fulfill the needs we have had 
when writing this thesis. 
 
 
5.1 IFS 
 
When issuing a corrective action in IFS these questions and descriptions should, in our 
opinion, be answered: 
- Does the corrective action involve repairs?  
- Does it involve spare parts?  
- When is it to be executed?  
- Have it, or will it, lead to down time (experienced consequences)? If not, could it have 
led to down time if in another operational phase (potential consequences)?  
- Estimation of downtime. 
- What equipment is involved? 
- Time used on the action 
- Operation mode of equipment involved 
- Description of failure (should be short and to the point) 
- Description of wanted action 
- Description of action performed and experiences made 
 
The descriptions should be written in such a way that they easily can be sorted, analyzed and 
used by management. 
 
Today internal guidelines for IFS dictate that most of this information should be filled out, but 
the potential consequences and operation mode of the equipment is neither a requirement nor 
option.  
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When going through IFS today checking the quality of the issued corrective work orders some 
issues were found: 
- A high percentage of the work orders lack information about downtime  
- Potential consequences not a part of the reports 
- Very high amount of work orders miss fault description 
- Many work orders lack work description  
- Many work orders lack work details  
- Operation mode not a part of the reports 
- Spare parts and repair not a part of the reports 
 
To check how well the reports correspond with the existing guidelines for work orders in IFS 
we did a quantitative study of reports with missing information. This quantitative analysis 
over the entire lifecycle of IFS gave us Table 26, the average percentage of reports lacking 
vital information is here very high. After some research we found that the guidelines had been 
altered several times since the beginning, we therefore decided to do the same analysis over 
again, but this time only for 2010. As one can see from Table 27 the numbers here is much 
lower than from the first analysis. 
 
Table 26: Work orders missing information in percentage 
 Missing fault 
description 
Missing work 
description 
Missing work 
details 
Missing 
downtime info 
Alpha 41% 13% 19% 37% 
Epsilon 43% 27% 30% 43% 
Navigator 23% 26% 11% 31% 
Venture 27% 31% 14% 31% 
Phoenix 20% 27% 4% 34% 
Average 31% 25% 16% 35% 
 
Table 27: Work orders missing vital information in percentage for 2010 
 Missing fault 
description 
Missing work 
description 
Missing work 
details 
Missing 
downtime info 
Alpha 24% 8% 1% 8% 
Epsilon 11% 15% 2% 2% 
Navigator 9% 21% 2% 2% 
Venture 22% 30% 1% 3% 
Phoenix 14% 34% 2% 12% 
Average 16% 22% 2% 5% 
 
 
When we compare the analysis for 2010 to the analysis of the entire life cycle we get Table 
28. Here we again see a significant improvement in the quality of the reports. Most WO`s 
now contain work details and downtime information and there is a significant increase in 
WO`s containing fault description. There is still a large amount of WO`s missing work 
descriptions, here there have been little improvement in 2010. The reason for both the high 
percentage missing fault descriptions and the high percentage missing work descriptions can 
be found in the requirements to the reports. 
 
In our opinion both fault description and work description should be required for any 
corrective work order in IFS.  
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Table 28: Percent improvement in 2010 compared to life time average 
 Fault 
description 
reporting 
Work 
description 
reporting 
Work details 
reporting 
Downtime 
reporting 
Alpha 42% 38% 95% 78% 
Epsilon 74% 44% 93% 95% 
Navigator 61% 19% 82% 94% 
Venture 19% 3% 93% 90% 
Phoenix 30% -26% 50% 65% 
Average 45% 16% 83% 84% 
 
 
5.2 SYNERGI 
 
All rigs have to report incidents that cause downtime in Synergi; the reports are the 
responsibility of the Rig Manager and quality checked by an onshore technical administrator. 
Since Synergi first was taken into use in the beginning of 2010 there has been a high focus on 
the quality of the reports. All reports have been quality checked by the onshore technical 
administrator and there has been a continuous dialogue between the rigs and the technical 
administrator and monthly reports have been made.  
 
Every month there is made and distributed a report on the quality of the reports in Synergi. 
These reports show a significant improvement since the beginning of 2010 with almost all 
reports fulfilling the internal requirements when this thesis was written. 
 
The data used from Synergi in this thesis was from 2010 and we could clearly see an 
improvement in the quality as we worked our way from the beginning of 2010 until the end. 
Especially we noted that the root causes and actions done was of variable quality in the start, 
but significantly better in the end, fulfilling all our needs. 
 
 
5.3 DODA 
 
DODA (Daily Operation Database Application) contains daily operational data from each rig. 
Each rig reports rig status, drilling progress, weather conditions and various HSEQ issues 
daily to DODA. In addition each rig also have a weekly report that contains a short summary 
of the daily reports for the last week, month, quarter, year, current and last week. The weekly 
report also contains comments from the platform manager on last week’s activities and plans 
for the week to come. 
 
In order to track the downtime of rigs, at what times the downtime occurred, if it was planned 
or unplanned and to fin short descriptions of the causes of the downtimes DODA worked 
more or less flawlessly for us in this study. 
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5.4 Correlation between the databases 
 
All unexpected downtime that requires some sort of work to be done on equipment in order to 
regain operation should be reported as a corrective action in IFS, this report should be marked 
as causing downtime in IFS. If we compare the reported downtime due to corrective actions in 
IFS with the reported downtime in Synergi we get Table 29. We can see that there is a very 
small amount of days that have reported downtime in IFS and Synergi.  
 
Table 29: Reported downtime days in Synergi vs reported corrective actions in IFS on the same dates 
 
It is however important to note that the downtime reported in Synergi in large parts don’t 
require any work orders in order to regain operation. If we assume that all the maintenance 
related downtime requires a work order in order for the rig to resume operation there should 
be a total of approximately 35% percentage of the days with downtime events reported in IFS. 
This number is likely to be a little high since the work done in order to regain operation in 
some cases don’t require a work order. It should be fair to assume that the percentage should 
be fairly equal for all the rigs and not as varying as the case is here, going from 0 to 21%. It 
seems like West Venture and West Alpha have unnatural low amount of IFS downtime 
reports on days with downtime compared to the rest of the rigs. 
 
If we look at days with corrective actions reported as leading to downtime in IFS and not 
registered in Synergi we get Table 30. Since we know that the downtime information in 
Synergi is quality assured and checked against DODA we assume it to be correct. The IFS 
reports of downtime events that we can see in Table 30 must therefore contain wrong 
information about the time of the event or if it has caused downtime. 
 
Table 30: Downtime reports of downtime on days with no registered downtime in Synergi 
Rig Days IFS reports 
Alpha 5 6 
Navigator 12 14 
Epsilon 10 11 
Venture 6 6 
Phoenix 5 12 
Total 38 49 
 
The downtime information in DODA is quality assured by both onshore and offshore 
personnel and the downtime information in Synergi is checked against DODA again. This 
makes the information in both Synergi and DODA to be of a satisfying quality.  
 
 
 Correspondence between days with IFS reports and downtime 
 Downtime Days  
reported in Synergi 
With Downtime 
Report in IFS 
With Unknown 
Report in IFS 
Percentage with  
IFS downtime report 
Alpha 43 3 7 6,98 % 
Navigator 110 20 9 18,18 % 
Epsilon 43 9 1 20,93 % 
Venture 28 0 6 0,00 % 
Phoenix 61 10 25 16,39 % 
Total 285 42 48 14,74 % 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
In order to effectively being able to analyze data from a database we experienced that the data 
must be in such a format that it easily can be sorted and key data extracted. For our use and by 
the requirements within NADL we found both DODA and Synergi to contain data with 
satisfying quality. The data we gathered from IFS was, however, of very variable quality, 
often not meeting our criteria’s and being insufficient for us to successfully do all our 
intended analyses. 
 
The reasons for this might be many, but we believe some of the key reasons are: 
- The reporting in DODA is not only used internally, but also externally against 
contractors for financial reasons. The focus and resources used on the quality of the 
data in this database have, as a consequence of this, been high.  
 
- When NADL started to gather downtime information in Synergi they decided to 
closely follow up on the quality of the received reports, having onshore personnel that 
gave individual feedback to each rig as well as making weekly and monthly reports of 
the quality. We can clearly see that having such individual feedback as well as weekly 
and monthly reports has increased the quality of the reports. 
 
- Common for both DODA and Synergi is the clearly defined demands and guidelines 
for the reports. The data we have used from both Synergi and DODA have been for 
downtime with direct economic consequences for the company. 
 
- The data we have used from IFS have mainly been for corrective actions, and in large 
parts without the same direct economic consequences as the downtime reported in 
DODA and Synergi. 
- The guidelines have not been as clearly defined and the interface has not been as user-
friendly as it could have been. Both the interface and the guidelines have been 
improved lately and one can clearly see the effect of this on the report quality, 
especially in 2010. 
 
The improvement in IFS is also explained by the onshore Maintenance and Logistics Manager 
in the following way: 
 
“Since app. summer 2009 have we focused on improvements with regards on registration and 
reporting of corrective actions. During 2011 will we held course within IFS for all end users 
on our units. Some need refresh course and new employers need basic course. 
Corporate have also started an improvement project within IFS and the goal is to make IFS 
more user friendly and implement permission control. Permission control will help us to 
secure good quality on all new corrective actions before they are released.” 
 
This statement matches and supports our findings and conclusions regarding report quality in 
IFS good. 
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6. Analysis verification and validation 
 
In order to evaluate the maintenance management and to verify and validate our analysis’s we 
have interviewed some key personnel both offshore and onshore.  
 
 
6.1 Interview with key personnel 
 
In order to better understand and interpret our collected and analyzed data we have 
interviewed some key onshore and offshore personnel about their view on the data collected, 
how the maintenance have been done in NADL, how it should be done and the quality and 
importance of reporting. We also wanted to check how the key personnel’s personal beliefs 
corresponded with the collected data, and if there were any differences between the onshore 
and offshore personnel. The questionnaires can be found in Appendix B – Questionnaires. 
 
From the collected data we found a significant decrease in downtime events around 2006 
which we could not see any obvious explanation for. The interviews tell us that this decrease 
most likely is caused by the introduction of first line maintenance. 
 
When asked if not only the occurred consequences, but also the potential consequences 
should be evaluated when classifying a failure, almost 90% answered that the potential 
consequences also should be evaluated. The main reasons they give for this is that it could 
prevent downtime and reduce the risk for accidents by being able to perform better analyzes 
to determine frequencies, mean time to failure etc. and adjusting the maintenance schedule 
accordingly. 
 
When it comes to report quality it is clear that the maintenance planners for the different rigs 
are responsible for ensuring the quality of reports in IFS. But, when we asked the offshore 
personnel how satisfied they are with the feedback they receive on the quality of these reports 
we discovered that this feedback is lacking for some of the personnel. The personnel that have 
received feedback on the quality did not find the feedback very satisfying and ranked it as 3 
out of 6, where 6 is very satisfied. 
 
The onshore personnel feel the biggest challenge in order to improve the report quality from 
the offshore personnel is the 2-4 schedules, different cultures on different rigs and IFS 
interface. Not using IFS and reporting for four weeks at the time makes it harder to get good 
reporting routines. The offshore personnel often come from different previous rig companies 
with different cultures and routines when it comes to reporting, which affects their current 
reports. Last, but not least, choosing the best combination of mandatory fields in IFS for 
reports have been, and still is, a challenge. 
 
Offshore personnel feel that the onshore personnel best can help them improve the report 
quality by giving individual feedback on report quality, having one clear single point of 
contact and improve the IFS interface. 
 
The offshore personnel are also often unsure on how the IFS reports are being used in order to 
improve maintenance. Some does however use historical data on the equipment in order to 
better plan future jobs and maintenance. The onshore personnel have mainly used this data for 
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new processes and procedures under preparation and start-up. It has not been a part of any 
continuous process or any good system until now. NADL is working towards a reliability 
centered maintenance (RCM) program (Moubray, 1997), where the maintenance will be 
evaluated continuously based on reports and experiences from the different rigs. The 
implementation of RCM is a repeating theme when interviewing the onshore personnel. 
 
When we ask how much of the total downtime the different personnel believe is caused by 
insufficient maintenance almost all believe it to be one of the least causing root causes. Our 
analysis’s show that insufficient maintenance was one of the main contributors to downtime 
events in 2010 being the cause of around 36% of the total number of downtime events. But, if 
we look at the amount of downtime hours insufficient maintenance caused we get 
approximately 11% of the total downtime.  
 
When asked to rank the contribution from seven different root causes the onshore personnel 
believed poor design to be the main contributor, while the offshore personnel were far less 
united in their beliefs. The ranking from the offshore personnel didn’t show any common 
belief about the main contributor, in total 5 of 7 root causes were ranked as main contributor 
from the offshore personnel. The two root causes that weren’t ranked as main contributor in 
any interview were insufficient maintenance and poor quality. In total they believe 
insufficient maintenance to be on fifth place in downtime contribution, and on average fourth 
place. The overall ranking from the interviews versus the actual results from the analyses 
done in this paper is shown in Table 31. 
 
Table 31: Ranking of root causes causing downtime by onshore and offshore personnel 
Causes of downtime Onshore Personnel Offshore Personnel 
Poor design 1 2 
Insufficient 
maintenance 
4 5 
Poor quality 2 2 
Poor planning 6 1 
Equipment 
operational 
limitations exceeded 
2 2 
Lack of tools 7 7 
Lack of spare part 5 6 
 
On average the interviewed offshore personnel seem to be using around 25% of their working 
hours on reports, or 3 hours each day. When asked to rank how they feel the time they use on 
the reports are worth it from 1 to 6, where 6 is very much, we get an average of 4.3.  
 
Offshore personnel working in technical performing positions such as electricians does not 
see the value of reporting downtime in IFS, while offshore personnel in technical leader 
positions see it as useful in order to use historical WO`s and improve maintenance routines. 
 
When the offshore personnel were asked what they believe are the major challenges in order 
to reduce maintenance related downtime in the future we received many different answers. 
Replacing old equipment, getting spare parts faster delivered, more people and training are 
some of the answers.  
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When asked how NADL best can overcome these challenges we also receive many different 
answers. More mechanical personnel onshore, increased focus on preventive maintenance, use 
planned hours, increased focus on competence and more maintenance were some of the 
answers from the offshore personnel. 
 
The onshore personnel were asked how they intend to reduce maintenance related downtime, 
and answered that they are introducing RCM, increasing focus on KPI`s, internal training and 
improving standard job descriptions. 
 
 
6.2 Conclusions from interviews 
 
When we compare the interviews with our analyses of the downtime root causes it is clear 
that both onshore and offshore personnel have a pretty good understanding of how much of 
the total downtime is caused by insufficient maintenance. The ranking from the onshore and 
offshore interviews is fairly similar, with the exception of one root cause; Poor planning. It is 
interesting that offshore personnel rank poor planning as the main contributing root cause, 
while onshore personnel rank it as the second least. The reasons for this might be many, but it 
is something that should be studied further by NADL. Having good communication, common 
goals and beliefs amongst offshore and onshore personnel is in our opinion important in order 
to ensure the organization to perform at its best. It might seem like there is room for 
improvement in the communication between the onshore planners and the offshore personnel. 
Improving this communication might help correct the impression offshore personnel have 
regarding poor planning being the number one cause of downtime. 
 
Both onshore and offshore personnel believe that potential consequences as well as the 
occurred consequences should be reported. The higher position the interviewed personnel 
have the more they seem to value not only the occurred, but also the potential consequences. 
 
When it comes to the quality of the reports, the interviews revealed that the offshore 
personnel don’t feel they get the support they need in order to improve this. This is, in our 
opinion, a matter of improving the communication between responsible personnel onshore 
and the reporting personnel offshore. Personal feedback from responsible parties onshore to 
the responsible and performing parties offshore is in our opinion the best way to do this. 
 
The biggest and most effective change in maintenance management historically in NADL 
accordingly to both offshore and onshore personnel is the introduction of 1-st line 
maintenance. First-line maintenance was introduced around 2006 and our analyses support 
this belief and show a decrease in downtime events after 2006. Before 2006 all lubrication 
and visual inspection was done on a one month basis. With the introduction of first line 
maintenance there were developed a detailed maintenance program with descriptions of what 
and when to inspect and lubricate. The schedules now become adapted to the specific 
equipment, either being daily, weekly or each other week instead of monthly for all. With the 
alteration in schedules the maintenance inspection now involved more personnel, since the 
increased frequency made more shifts involved. Having several different persons inspecting 
and lubricating the equipment instead of one increase the chances of detecting any developing 
failures. One soon experienced that with the introduction of first line maintenance one were 
better able to detect failures before they occurred. Especially developing failures in hydraulic 
hoses were detected more frequently before failure.   
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7. Summary and discussion 
 
The aim of this thesis is to improve the way failures caused by insufficient maintenance are 
being managed and reported on drilling rigs and thereby reducing the overall downtime and 
related cost for the rigs. 
 
The thesis have been trying to look into the quality of reports for critical and non-critical 
failures, identifying the potential consequences of non-critical failures and identifying 
downtime trends and possible reasons for these. 
 
The results of the analysis`s, interviews and information gathering done in order to find this is 
discussed in this chapter.    
 
 
Main contributors to downtime 
 
We found poor or insufficient maintenance to be the root cause of around 36% of the total 
downtime events, but only 10% of the total downtime costs between January and October 
2010.  
 
Poor quality and design were the two main root causes in the same period of time; both are 
typically associated with 3
rd
 part suppliers. 3
rd
 party suppliers were responsible for 68% of the 
downtime in the same period of time. 
 
Of equipment we discovered that 15 groups were responsible for 94% of the total downtime 
for the rigs studied between January and October 2010. Of these 15 groups we ended up with 
11 groups when we only took into account maintenance related downtime, these 11 groups are 
listed in Table 32.  
 
Table 32: Our chosen 11 equipment groups for further studies and the related SFI group code 
Equipment Group SFI group code 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment 313 
Riser system incl. choke, kill and booster lines 335 
Blowout preventer control system 332 
Miscellaneous equipment for pipe/tubular handling 347 
Drill floor tubular handling equipment 342 
Drawworks & machinery 312 
Derrick mounted vertical pipe handling system 341 
Mud supply 325 
Drilling control 311 
Overhead cranes 362 
Choke and kill system incl. mud/gas separator 336 
 
Of these 11 groups one group contributed with more downtime, calculated by cost, than the 
rest combined; the Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group. 
 
Despite poor or insufficient maintenance being the root cause in a large percentage of the 
downtime events it is not causing as long downtime as other root causes. The downtime 
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caused by 3
rd
 party suppliers, typically poor quality and design causes far more downtime 
hours. 
 
Of the maintenance related downtime we clearly see that there are a few groups contributing 
with almost all the downtime. One should, in our opinion, start by looking closely at the 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group, which contributed with over 60% of 
the maintenance related downtime costs. 
 
 
Changes in downtime and possible reasons for this: 
 
There has been a decrease in yearly downtime events since 2005, with a significant reduction 
between 2006 and 2007. When we saw this decrease in downtime events we expected to see a 
similar decrease in downtime hours, with a significant reduction between 2006 and 2007 also 
here. But when we look at the downtime hours for the different rigs we are not able to see this 
same significant reduction between 2006 and 2007, instead we discover an increase in 
downtime hours from 2005 until 2008. This downtime is however largely influence by one 
single rig, West Navigator, and when we choose to ignore the contribution from this rig we 
get another picture. We then get a slight reduction in downtime from 2005 until 2010, but still 
no significant decrease between 2006 and 2007. We analyzed the spare part consumption, 
corrective actions reported and planned maintenance without finding any trends able to 
explain the reduction in downtime events between 2006 and 2007. From a purely analytical 
perspective this reduction seemed to be without any obvious reason, but a change that large 
that persists is, in our opinion, not random. Through interviews with key personnel we found 
that NADL had introduced first line maintenance in the same period of time as the significant 
decrease in downtime events had occurred.  
 
The introduction of first line maintenance altered the existing routines and schedules for 
visual inspection and lubrication of the equipment on the rigs. This alteration seems to have 
decreased the number of downtime events without decreasing the downtime to the same 
degree. This can be explained by the severity of the type of downtime events reduced by the 
introduction of first line maintenance. Since first line maintenance mainly is about visual 
inspection and lubrication the decrease in downtime events most likely have been caused by a 
reduction in failures of hydraulic hoses. Failures in hydraulic hoses can cause downtime, but 
to replace the hose and regain operation is rarely a very time consuming operation. 
 
The contribution to the overall downtime from smaller and less critical failures such as 
failures in hydraulic hoses is very small compared to the contribution from a few highly 
critical equipment groups. Here three groups stand out as especially critical; 
- Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment 
- Riser system incl. choke, kill and booster lines 
- Blowout preventer control system 
 
When we exclude any downtime not directly related to insufficient or poor maintenance the 
Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group stands out with over six times as high 
cost/downtime as the second group. This group has the highest number of downtime events 
and the highest average cost/downtime for each event. It, alone, caused around 60% of the 
maintenance related downtime between January and October 2010. We found this group to 
have a decrease in planned maintenance reports in IFS from 2004 until today. One would 
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expect that the planned maintenance on this group would be increasing and altered in order 
for it to become less dominant in its downtime contribution.  
 
 
Planned downtime versus unplanned downtime 
 
Since planned maintenance is subject to contractual agreements it is hard to make any 
decisive conclusions based on the reported planned downtime. We can however see signs of a 
pattern where an increase in planned downtime reduces not only the unplanned downtime but 
also the total downtime. Planned downtime isn’t caused by any instant failure in equipment 
and has to be reported and agreed upon with the contractor at least 48 hours prior to the 
downtime. We believe that the reduction in the overall downtime when increasing the planned 
downtime is because we are able to perform maintenance and inspection on equipment that 
we in normal operation are unable to perform. 
 
 
Spare Part consumption and possible influence on downtime: 
 
The spare part consumption has been slightly decreasing, but we have not found any obvious 
link between changes in the spare part consumption and changes in downtime hours or events. 
We did however discover that two of the groups we found to be especially critical with 
regards to downtime also had the highest consumption of spare parts measured by its cost. 
Both the Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group and the Blowout preventer 
control system group have a high spare part consumption as well as downtime cost, especially 
the Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group. As for the downtime caused by 
these groups large parts of the consumption is concentrated over short periods of time. Based 
on this we believe it is fair to assume that these groups are more likely to experience single 
severe failures, causing high spare part consumption and downtime, than the other groups in 
this study. 
 
We also see that the Mud Supply group has the second most average downtime cost per event 
while having the highest spare part consumption measured by its cost. There have not been 
many downtime events caused by this group, but the few events that have occurred have been 
expensive. So despite having the highest spare cost it is, in our opinion, worth the cost when 
you look at the cost of a possible downtime event. 
 
The Choke and kill system incl. mud/gas separator group have the second highest spare costs, 
but this group have a very low average cost per downtime event. We do however only know 
about the downtime costs for a single event for this group, making a poor basis to make any 
conclusions based on. We do however believe that the spare part consumption on this group 
should be evaluated against the failure rate as it can seem as the maintenance costs more than 
its preventive value. 
 
If we compare the spare part costs for each rig against its downtime in 2010 we see that West 
Navigator dominates both. It is hard to find any reasons for this, but we suspect that West 
Navigator dominates the spare part costs since the downtime events it have experienced have 
required high quantities of spare parts and on expensive equipment. It is, in our opinion, fair 
to assume that spare parts on highly critical equipment often are more expensive than for less 
critical equipment. The higher criticality the equipment has, the higher the requirements for 
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the equipment itself and its spare parts should be.  For the other rigs it seems like the higher 
the spare part costs are the lower the downtime is.  
 
 
Changes in planned maintenance and possible effects on downtime 
 
When we started to analyze the amount of planned maintenance done on our selected 
equipment groups we expected to see changes from year to year as a sign of the maintenance 
program being continuously improved. We hoped that these changes could be directly related 
to changes in the downtime and that we could use this information to further suggest 
improvements. We could see some changes from year to year in the amount of planned 
maintenance carried out, but it changes were quite small and did not correspond with any 
changes in downtime events or hours. 
 
The biggest changes have been for the Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group 
and the Mud supply group, with a reduction of around 25% in reported planned maintenance 
from 2004 until 2010. We cannot find any sign that this reduction in planned maintenance has 
influenced the number of downtime events or hours for the same groups. 
 
 
Major overhaul for classing and possible related effects on downtime 
 
In order to investigate the possible effects a major overhaul have on the needed corrective 
maintenance and downtime we did two case studies; one for the year before and after West 
Alpha`s last major overhaul and one for the five years between the last two major overhauls 
for West Venture. We expected the results to be somewhat similar for both these cases; 
showing an increasing trend of corrective maintenance performed and downtime experienced 
between the overhauls. 
 
The case study of West Alpha show a significant decrease in both downtime experienced and 
corrective maintenance performed the first year after the overhaul compared to the last year 
before the overhaul. 
 
The case study of West Venture did not give us the results we expected. There was, if 
anything, a decreasing trend in the downtime experienced between the overhauls. The average 
monthly downtime was similar the first 18 months after the first overhaul as for the last 18 
months before the second overhaul. 
 
The average monthly amount of corrective actions performed between the overhauls 
fluctuated heavily, but there were no evident increasing or decreasing trend. 
 
The West Alpha case clearly shows us that the major overhaul have had an impact on the 
downtime and needed corrective maintenance. We believe this to be the case also for West 
Venture, with the difference being that the overhaul made it possible for West Venture to 
keep a low failure rate between the major overhauls without reducing it as in the West Alpha 
case. For the West Venture case it can seem like the interval between the major overhauls 
could have been longer. 
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Non-critical failures and their potential 
 
When we first started writing this thesis one of our intended goals was to discover any hidden 
downtime that could be related to insufficient or poor maintenance. We soon realized that the 
way corrective maintenance was reported within NADL made this difficult for us to achieve. 
The failures that don’t cause rig downtime are only reported in IFS and the content and 
quality of these reports were insufficient for us to discover the potential of these failures. 
 
It is, in our opinion, very important to identify not only the occurred consequences of the 
failure, but also the potential consequences. The same failure can be critical in one phase of 
the operation and non-critical in another phase, despite the operation of the equipment itself 
being similar. Since the operation of the equipment is similar the failures that are classified as 
non-critical could just as well have been critical. By ignoring this potential consequence of the 
failure we get a wrong picture of the probability of downtime. When setting up a maintenance 
program we strive to find the balance between the cost and the savings of the maintenance. It 
is therefore important that we get as correct as possible probabilities when we calculate the 
potential savings associated with the increase in maintenance. This is not only limited to the 
cost directly related to down-time, but also the indirect losses caused by loss in reputation and 
similar. 
 
 
Quality of the reports and data used 
 
Here we experienced large differences from database to database with DODA and Synergi 
providing data with good quality while the quality of the data in IFS strongly varied from 
report to report. The reports in IFS did in many cases not meet internal requirements and 
never our requirements.  
 
In order to effectively being able to analyze data from a database we believe that the data 
must be in such a format that it easily can be sorted and key data extracted. For our use and by 
the requirements within NADL we found both DODA and Synergi to contain data with 
satisfying quality. The data we gathered from IFS was, however, of very variable quality, 
often not meeting our criteria’s and being insufficient for us to successfully do all our 
intended analyses. 
 
The reasons for this might be many, but we believe some of the key reasons are: 
- The reporting in DODA is not only used internally, but also externally against 
contractors for financial reasons. The focus and resources used on the quality of the 
data in this database have, as a consequence of this, been high.  
 
- When NADL started to gather downtime information in Synergi they decided to 
closely follow up on the quality of the received reports, having onshore personnel that 
gave individual feedback to each rig as well as making weekly and monthly reports of 
the quality. We can clearly see that having such individual feedback as well as weekly 
and monthly reports has increased the quality of the reports. 
 
- Common for both DODA and Synergi is the clearly defined demands and guidelines 
for the reports. The data we have used from both Synergi and DODA have been for 
downtime with direct economic consequences for the company. 
 
 63 
- The data we have used from IFS have mainly been for corrective actions, and in large 
parts without the same direct economic consequences as the downtime reported in 
DODA and Synergi. 
- The guidelines have not been as clearly defined and the interface has not been as user-
friendly as it could have been. Both the interface and the guidelines have been 
improved lately and one can clearly see the effect of this on the report quality, 
especially in 2010. 
 
The improvement in IFS is also explained by the onshore Maintenance and Logistics Manager 
in the following way: 
 
“Since app. summer 2009 have we focused on improvements with regards on registration and 
reporting of corrective actions. During 2011 will we held course within IFS for all end users 
on our units. Some need refresh course and new employers need basic course. 
Corporate have also started an improvement project within IFS and the goal is to make IFS 
more user friendly and implement permission control. Permission control will help us to 
secure good quality on all new corrective actions before they are released.” 
 
This statement matches and supports our findings and conclusions regarding report quality in 
IFS good. 
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8. Suggested improvements 
 
As a result of the information gathered and analyzed in this thesis we have been able to come 
up with some suggestions for improvements. These suggestions will be listed and briefly 
explained in this chapter. 
 
Improve report quality 
 
- Make sure that similar failures on the same equipment across rigs are reported 
similarly so they easily can be sorted out and used for further analysis. 
o What equipment and what type of failure should be chosen from a predefined 
list. 
- Increased focus on personal feedback to the reporting personnel 
o Make the reporting personnel see the value in good report quality 
o Ensure the reporting personnel are notified about any changes in interface and 
reporting guidelines by having these posted on the intranet 
o Have focus on the language used. Everyone need to use the same terms and 
notations. 
- Demand the reports of corrective maintenance to include potential consequences, 
possibly by a drop down curtain with a ranking choice of potential consequences. The 
ranking could be: 
o 1. Potential downtime above 24 hours 
o 2. Potential downtime 12-24 hours 
o 3. Potential downtime 6-12 hours 
o 4. Potential downtime 3-6 hours 
o 5. Potential downtime 1-3 hours 
o 6. Potential downtime 0-1 hours 
o 7. No potential downtime (default) 
- Evaluate the way reporting is done in IFS today. 
o Only have one possible way to report corrective maintenance 
o Make as much of the input data as possible chosen from a predefined list 
o The predefined lists should be easy to understand and avoid having any option 
such as “others”. Having the option to report something under “others” can 
reduce the overall quality of the reports as the reporting personnel might use 
this even in cases where another option is valid. Therefore a set of valid 
options covering all possible needs should be defined, avoiding the “other” 
option 
- Regular reports of the data quality in IFS should be made and distributed to all 
reporting personnel. These reports should reflect the report quality of the different rigs 
as well as technical sections of the rigs. Similar reports are made and distributed for 
the report quality in DODA today with good results. 
 
Reduce downtime 
 
- Increase focus on preventing failure on the most critical equipment groups 
o Especial focus on the Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment group 
- Better control of 3rd part suppliers 
o Increased focus on inspection of delivered equipment throughout its production 
and at delivery 
- Maximize the use of planned downtime as this seems to reduce the overall downtime 
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- Continuously gather and analyze maintenance data in order to optimize the 
maintenance routines and schedule. Use reliability centered maintenance. 
- Improve the quality of the maintenance data in IFS. 
 
Find and possibly reduce the number of hidden downtime events 
- Make it possible to sort out failures that have the potential to cause rig downtime 
o Demand reported corrective actions in IFS to contain information about the 
potential consequences 
o Possibly export all reported downtime events and events with the potential for 
downtime into an own database 
 Collecting information from IFS, Synergi and DODA about all events 
causing downtime or with the potential to cause downtime 
 Must contain information about the failure type, equipment, severity 
and actions performed 
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9. Conclusion 
 
During our work with this thesis we found the downtime caused by insufficient or poor 
maintenance to be low compared to other causes. The main contributor to downtime was 
caused by 3
rd
 party suppliers and typically subject to poor design and quality of the delivered 
equipment. Increased inspection routines and stricter quality assurance of delivered equipment 
and manufacturers can help reduce this, it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid this 
downtime with maintenance. 
 
The introduction of first line maintenance on the rigs in 2006 has shown to significantly 
reduce the number of downtime events, but not the downtime hours to the same extent. This 
and further analysis tells us that the maintenance related downtime in large parts are 
dominated by single events on highly critical equipment, with the Rotary table, top drive and 
associated equipment group being the main contributor to downtime. 
It is, in our opinion, a larger potential for reducing  the downtime by increasing the focus and 
limiting the probability of these single events to occur than to try further limiting the number 
of less severe downtime events.  
 
When there was an increase in planned downtime we found a decrease in the overall 
downtime, which suggest that more use of planned downtime is likely to reduce the overall 
downtime. Having a certain amount of planned downtime will therefore not only be beneficial 
for NADL, but also for the contractor(s), reducing the overall downtime and length of 
operation. 
 
To better identify hidden downtime and use this to possible reduce downtime we found the 
existing data quality to be insufficient, especially for the years prior to 2010. 
 
The data collected in DODA used in this report have direct economic consequences and are 
made both for internal use and external reporting. Accordingly the data gathered have 
received high attention in order to maintain the needed quality. The same can be said for the 
data we have used from Synergi, where regular reports and feedback of the report quality 
have been given by dedicated onshore personnel in order to improve the quality. 
 
The introduction of downtime reports in Synergi have made it possible to more effectively 
analyze the causes of downtime and the actions taken, it proved to be a very effective tool 
when searching for root causes both by category and supplier. 
 
The data collected from IFS is however not subject to such direct economic consequences and 
are only for internal use. This reflects in the resources used to ensure the quality and also the 
quality of the data itself when compared to existing internal requirements and guidelines. In 
addition we found the reports following the internal guidelines and internal requirements to be 
insufficient for us to properly use the data to find potential hidden downtime events and key 
areas to improve the maintenance on. 
 
To improve the quality of the reports in IFS we identified a few key factors we believe to be 
vital:  
- Using predefined criteria’s for as many report categories as possible 
- Limit the predefined criteria’s to a minimum while still covering all possible needs 
without having the possibility to choose “other”. 
- Only have one way of reporting a corrective action, as opposed to two as of today 
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- Make sure the reporting personnel use the same terms and notations when reporting 
- Improve the communication between reporting personal and responsible onshore 
personnel by giving individual feedback on report quality 
- Make sure that all reporting personnel see the value of good report quality 
- Make regular reports, weekly or monthly, of the quality of the reports in IFS that are 
distributed to all reporting personnel. The quality of the reports should be measured 
for each rig and for the technical sections, possibly also for the different shifts. Such 
reports will possibly make the reporting personnel more aware of the quality and see 
the value of the reports clearer; it will also make for internal competition between rigs, 
technical sections and shifts. 
- Continue to improve the IFS interface with the aid of personnel feedback, making the 
interface easy and understandable for all users. 
 
We believe these factors to potentially improving the quality of the reports measured against 
existing internal criteria’s, but we also believe that the reports should contain a different set of 
information than what it does today.  
 
In order to better minimize downtime and identify the criticality of equipment we believe that 
the potential consequences of a failure should be a part of any corrective maintenance report 
in IFS. This is already done for all hazards and accident situations by the Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway (PSA), covering not all situations that have led to or could have led to 
damage to health, safety or environment under slightly altered circumstances (PTIL et al., 
2002). This data is used done in order to minimize the amount of such events offshore. 
 
Gathering all the data about downtime events and events with a potential for downtime caused 
by insufficient or poor maintenance in one single database can be a way to better determine 
the need of maintenance on different equipment. Such a database will make it possible to 
continuously analyze and improve the maintenance in order to limit the downtime. The 
transfer of lessons learned from rig to rig will also be more effective with such a database, 
since maintenance routines might be continuously updated and distributed to all rigs with 
similar equipment. 
 
To sum it all up we believe that in order to reduce the maintenance related downtime; 
improving the data quality of work reports (IFS), evaluate and change the work report 
guidelines for IFS, have one database combining information from IFS, DODA and Synergi 
about events that have led to or potentially could have led to downtime and to reduce the 
probability for severe single downtime events to occur to be the best way to proceed. 
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Appendix A – Corrective Actions reported in IFS 
 
The following tables are made with data from the internal database IFS. The tables show the 
yearly amount of corrective actions reported in IFS for the different equipment groups from 
2004 until 2010. 
 
 Rotary table, top drive and associated equipment 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 30 82 32 19 0 163 40,8 
2005 40 63 36 25 0 164 41 
2006 71 51 11 30 0 163 40,8 
2007 46 39 9 32 0 126 31,5 
2008 63 48 13 25 5 154 30,8 
2009 38 47 23 26 37 171 34,2 
2010 32 47 20 34 49 182 36,4 
Total 320 377 144 191 91 1123 36,5 
        
        
 Riser system incl choke, kill and booster lines 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 19 0 16 49 0 84 21,0 
2005 17 0 20 230 0 267 66,75 
2006 26 2 13 65 0 106 26,5 
2007 23 1 13 39 0 76 19 
2008 23 0 8 33 3 67 13,4 
2009 23 2 10 25 19 79 15,8 
2010 16 1 11 8 15 51 10,2 
Total 147 6 91 449 37 730 24,7 
        
        
 Blowout preventer control system 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 17 17 13 135 0 182 45,5 
2005 27 5 13 248 0 293 73,25 
2006 42 14 11 67 0 134 33,5 
2007 58 13 7 97 0 175 43,75 
2008 65 7 14 192 5 283 56,6 
2009 56 12 24 67 20 179 35,8 
2010 28 11 18 16 20 93 18,6 
Total 293 79 100 822 45 1339 43,9 
        
        
 Miscellaneous equipment for pipe/tubular handling 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 9 2 2 103 0 116 29,0 
2005 6 2 1 128 0 137 34,25 
2006 7 0 0 124 0 131 32,8 
2007 15 1 0 74 0 90 22,5 
2008 9 1 0 86 1 97 19,4 
2009 13 1 1 75 27 117 23,4 
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2010 7 2 0 42 24 75 15 
Total 66 9 4 632 52 763 25,2 
 
 
 
Drill floor tubular handling equpiment 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 9 14 56 41 0 120 30,0 
2005 9 19 24 47 0 99 24,75 
2006 12 18 37 26 0 93 23,3 
2007 12 7 28 37 0 84 21 
2008 17 20 28 39 0 104 20,8 
2009 15 29 25 32 11 112 22,4 
2010 17 19 14 44 17 111 22,2 
Total 91 126 212 266 28 723 23,5 
        
        
        
 Drawworks & machinery 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator* Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 22 44 NA NA NA 66 33,0 
2005 12 39 NA NA NA 51 25,5 
2006 15 22 NA NA NA 37 18,5 
2007 14 32 NA NA NA 46 23,0 
2008 31 25 NA NA NA 56 28,0 
2009 19 35 NA NA NA 54 27,0 
2010 12 31 NA NA NA 43 21,5 
Total 125 228 0 0 0 353 25,2 
        
        
 Derrick mounted vertical pipe handling system 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 22 90 85 19 NA 216 54,0 
2005 39 78 55 20 NA 192 48,0 
2006 43 59 48 21 NA 171 42,8 
2007 32 69 51 16 NA 168 42,0 
2008 37 60 75 13 NA 185 46,3 
2009 35 64 44 33 86 262 52,4 
2010 31 57 40 8 100 236 47,2 
Total 239 477 398 130 186 1430 47,5 
        
        
 Mud supply 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 33 75 22 44 NA 174 43,5 
2005 99 101 40 44 NA 284 71,0 
2006 53 58 25 50 NA 186 46,5 
2007 36 51 6 23 NA 116 29,0 
2008 48 55 22 20 NA 145 36,3 
2009 26 74 13 23 21 157 31,4 
2010 30 55 5 30 28 148 29,6 
Total 325 469 133 234 49 1210 41,0 
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Drilling control 
  Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 19 44 9 25 NA 97 24,3 
2005 21 22 12 25 NA 80 20,0 
2006 23 19 16 23 NA 81 20,3 
2007 32 39 5 24 NA 100 25,0 
2008 25 66 2 20 NA 113 28,3 
2009 11 40 5 16 23 95 19,0 
2010 6 42 5 10 31 94 18,8 
Total 137 272 54 143 54 660 22,2 
        
        
 Overhead Cranes 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 18 1 29 19 NA 67 16,8 
2005 41 1 25 29 NA 96 24,0 
2006 35 2 27 30 NA 94 23,5 
2007 20 1 12 23 NA 56 14,0 
2008 23 0 14 7 NA 44 11,0 
2009 18 2 20 18 55 113 22,6 
2010 7 0 19 12 26 64 12,8 
Total 162 7 146 138 81 534 17,8 
        
        
 Choke and kill system incl. Mud/gas seperator 
 Year Alpha Epsilon Venture Navigator Phoenix Total Average per rig 
2004 9 27 2 8 NA 46 11,5 
2005 21 9 3 18 NA 51 12,8 
2006 10 5 2 10 NA 27 6,8 
2007 11 16 2 31 NA 60 15,0 
2008 21 17 5 23 NA 66 16,5 
2009 11 18 5 9 13 56 11,2 
2010 15 12 4 19 6 56 11,2 
Total 98 104 23 118 19 362 12,1 
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Appendix B – Questionnaires 
 
Interview onshore 
 
 
Figure 1: Downtime events reported in IFS 
 
1: As one can see from Figure 1 there was a significant decrease in reported downtime events 
in IFS from 2006 to 2008. How can this decrease be explained? 
 
2: How have Seadrill ensured that lessons learned on one rig with regards to maintenance are 
transferred to all relevant rigs? Please Explain 
 
3: From your perspective; should a failure be classified and evaluated by the potential or 
occurred consequences? 
 
4: What advantages and disadvantages would evaluating and classifying failures by its 
potential have? 
 
5: What have been the biggest challenges improving offshore crews report quality? 
 
6: How good is the communication between offshore and onshore personnel when it comes to 
report quality? 
 
7: What feedback on report quality is given to the responsible parties? 
 
8: How are IFS reports used by management for any statistics or in order to improve existing 
routines? 
 
9: How does the onshore management make the value of having good report quality visible to 
the responsible offshore personnel? 
 
10: What kind of studies have been done previously by Seadrill when it comes to maintenance 
optimization? 
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11: Have Seadrill ever considered having onshore personnel dedicated to ensuring the quality 
of reports in IFS? 
 
12: What information would a ”perfect” corrective report in IFS contain from your 
perspective? 
 
13: If you, without data, were to rank the causes off downtime from 1 to 6, where 1 is the one 
causing most, how would you rank them? 
 
Causes of downtime Rank 
Poor design,  
Insufficient maintenance,  
Poor quality  
Poor planning  
Equipment operational limitations exceeded  
Lack of tools  
Lack of spare part  
 
 
14: How many percentage of the total downtime do you believe is maintenance related? 
 
15: What are, in your opinion, the biggest challenges in order to reduce maintenance related 
downtime? 
 How does Seadrill intend to overcome these challenges? 
 What is the best way for Seadrill to overcome these challenges in your opinion? 
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Interview Offshore 
 
1: Around 2006 we can observe a significant decrease in reported downtime events in IFS. 
What, in your opinion, might be the cause of this decrease? 
 
2: How much are your internal maintenance routines influenced by lessons learned on other 
rigs? 
 
3: How much of your working hours do you estimate you use on reports? 
 
4: To what degree from 1 to 6 (where 6 is very much and 1 is not at all) do you feel that the 
amount of time you use on reports is worth it? 
 
5: How satisfied are you with the feedback you get on the quality of your reports in IFS on a 
level from 1 to 6 where 1 is very little and 6 is very much? 
 
6: How are the reports being used in order to improve maintenance routines in your 
experience? 
 
7: Today all reports in IFS shall contain information on whether the failure have caused 
downtime or not. Do you regard this as important information? 
 
8: How has the downtime information in IFS been of any use to you? 
 
9: If a failure could have lead to downtime do you see any value in this being reported, despite 
it not actually leading to downtime this time? 
 
10: If you, without data, were to rank the causes off downtime from 1 to 7, where 1 is the one 
causing most, how would you rank them? 
 
Causes of downtime Rank 
Poor design,  
Insufficient maintenance,  
Poor quality  
Poor planning  
Equipment operational limitations exceeded  
Lack of tools  
Lack of spare part  
 
11: How much of the total downtime on your rig do you believe is caused by poor/insufficient 
maintenance? Please explain 
 
12: What are, in your opinion, the biggest challenges in order to reduce maintenance related 
downtime? 
 
13: What is the best way for Seadrill to overcome these challenges in your opinion? 
 
14: How do you feel the new downtime reporting in Synergi affect your workload? 
 
15: Do you feel that the Synergi reports are put to good use and worth the work load? 
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16: How do you feel onshore personnel can support you best in order to improve report 
quality? 
 
17: Since you started working for Seadrill, what have been the biggest changes in the 
maintenance routines/philosophy? 
 
18: What changes in maintenance do you regard as the most successful in order to reduce 
downtime? 
 
19: Do you feel that your opinion and suggestions around the maintenance 
routines//philosophy are being considered to a satisfying degree? 
